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ABSTRACT
The present paper explores issues surrounding 
multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) in 
payment card markets from various angles. 
The Eurosystem’s public stance on interchange 
fees is neutral. However, the Eurosystem takes 
a keen interest in facilitating a constructive 
dialogue among the stakeholders involved in this 
debate. Transparency and clarity with respect to 
the real costs and beneﬁ  ts of different payment 
instruments are indispensable for a modern 
and harmonised European retail payments 
market. Interchange fees (if any) should be set 
at a reasonable level so as to promote overall 
economic efﬁ   ciency in compliance with 
competition rules.
JEL code: G21, D43, L13.
Keywords: Trade credit and debit cards, 
retail payment systems, two-sided markets, 
interchange fees.5
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The project of creating the Single Euro Payment 
Area (SEPA) represents a major step forward 
with respect to closer European integration. 
Most recently, SEPA credit transfers and direct 
debits have been successfully introduced. To 
complete the SEPA project, the third missing 
piece in the puzzle is SEPA for cards. 
Payment cards have become the non-cash 
payment instrument used most in Europe. 
Intrinsically tied to card payments are 
multilateral interchange fees (MIFs). In this 
context, the European Central Bank (ECB) takes 
the view that further clarity in the framework for 
cards, in particular with respect to interchange 
fees, is likely to foster the creation of an open 
market environment for existing and new card 
schemes and take the euro area forward along 
the road towards an advanced retail payment 
market. 
The present paper explores issues surrounding 
MIFs from various angles. The Eurosystem’s 
public stance on interchange fees is neutral. 
Interchange fees are typically an issue within 
the  ﬁ   eld of competence of the European 
Commission. However, the Eurosystem takes a 
keen interest in facilitating a constructive dialog 
among the stakeholders involved in this debate. 
In addition, the Eurosystem shares the view 
that it is crucial for the success of SEPA that 
cards can be used throughout the euro area to 
make euro payments without any geographical 
differentiation. 
Transparency and clarity with respect to the 
real costs and beneﬁ   ts of different payment 
instruments are indispensable for a modern 
and harmonised European retail payments 
market. Interchange fees (if any) should be set 
at a reasonable level and should not prevent 
the use of efﬁ   cient payment instruments. 
A sharp increase in cardholder costs could 
induce consumers to use less efﬁ  cient  means 
of payment, thereby hampering the success 
of, and the objectives pursued by, the SEPA 
project. Interchange fees (if any) should be 
set to promote overall economic efﬁ  ciency in 
compliance with competition rules. The future 
shape of the payment cards landscape in the 
euro area and the application of interchange fees 
(if any) would beneﬁ  t from a fresh and European 
approach.6
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the establishment of the Single Euro 
Payments Area (SEPA), there will be no 
difference in the euro area between national 
and cross-border retail payments. SEPA will 
strengthen European integration and is aimed 
at fostering competition and innovation, and 
at improving conditions for customers. With 
the united efforts of the European banking 
community, legislators and the central banking 
community, SEPA made a successful start with 
the introduction of the SEPA credit transfer 
in 2008 and the SEPA direct debit in 2009. 
However, in addition to SEPA credit transfers 
and direct debits, the focus is now moving to the 
third pillar of SEPA, namely SEPA for cards.
Without the success of SEPA for cards, 
the project will not be complete. Given the 
importance of SEPA for cards, the Eurosystem is 
acting as a “catalyst” with the aim of developing 
a framework for a competitive European cards 
market (European Central Bank (2010)). In this 
context, the Eurosystem provides guidance 
and expresses expectations that further clarity 
in the framework for cards, in particular with 
respect to interchange fees, is likely to foster 
the creation of an open market environment for 
existing an new card schemes and take the euro 
area further along the road towards an advanced 
retail payment market.
Cards are the most commonly used non-cash 
payment instrument in the European Union 
(EU).  1 The success of payment cards is 
associated to their convenient, safe and efﬁ  cient 
use. In most cases, card payments are linked to 
multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) that ﬂ  ow 
from the payee’s bank to the payer’s bank.  2 In 
Europe, every time a card payment is made, the 
consumer’s bank usually receives an interchange 
fee from the merchant’s bank. The issue of 
interchange fees in card payments is very 
complex and there can be substantial differences 
in the ways interchange fees are calculated and 
how they are interpreted. For many years, 
interchange fees have been a controversial issue 
subject to regulatory and antitrust investigations, 
and card schemes have cut cross-border and 
some national MIFs in order to comply with EU 
antitrust rules.
Against this background, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) is attempting to enhance the general 
understanding on the nature of interchange fees 
and their role in the proper functioning of card 
payments market. The present paper explores 
aspects of MIFs charged on card payments from 
an economic and legal perspective. It highlights 
the relevance and development of card payments. 
It reviews the existing economic literature and 
examines the theoretical justiﬁ  cations for, and 
economic rationale behind, interchange fees. 
The paper looks only at interchange fees for 
card payment transactions. Interchange fees 
for other payment instruments, e.g. direct debit 
payments, are not considered. Moreover, the 
paper presents existing experiences, options 
and interpretations of interchange fees in 
selected European countries. It seeks to identify 
potential issues that interchange fees may raise 
in terms of innovation in, and the efﬁ  ciency 
of, payment systems. The paper also compares 
some selected regulatory decisions by EU and 
national authorities, and assesses the roles 
that the respective authorities play in setting 
interchange fees. The study covers the whole 
European Union, but places an emphasis on the 
euro area and its member countries.
Numerous theoretical models on interchange 
fees have been established in the economic 
literature. However, there is only limited 
knowledge and evidence on market practices. 
The present study’s original contribution in 
this regard is that it comprehensively links 
important aspects of interchange fees from both 
an economic and a legal perspective. Where 
applicable, the study is enriched by fact-ﬁ  nding 
with respect to different practices and models in 
selected euro area countries.
See Section 2 for recent developments in card payment usage  1 
in Europe.
However, some card schemes function without MIFs and in  2 
other card schemes, the MIF is paid by the payer’s bank to the 
payee’s bank.7
ECB
Occasional Paper No 131
September 2011
1   INTRODUCTION
The Eurosystem’s public stance on interchange 
fees is neutral. Interchange fees are an issue 
by nature that falls within the ﬁ  eld of competence 
of the European Commission and national 
competition authorities. However, the Eurosystem 
endeavours to facilitate a constructive dialogue 
among the stakeholders involved in this 
debate. In addition, the Eurosystem shares the 
view that it is crucial for the success of SEPA 
that cards can be used throughout the euro area 
to make euro payments without any geographical 
differentiation. 
Transparency and clarity with respect to the 
real costs and beneﬁ   ts of different payment 
instruments are indispensable for a modern, 
competitive and integrated European retail 
payments market. Interchange fees (if any) 
should be set at a reasonable level and should 
not prevent the use of efﬁ  cient  payment 
instruments. A sharp increase in cardholder 
costs could induce consumers to use less 
efﬁ  cient means of payment, thereby hampering 
the success of, and the objectives pursued with, 
the SEPA project. Interchange fees (if any) 
should be set to promote overall economic 
efﬁ  ciency in compliance with competition rules. 
The Eurosystem recommends a close dialogue 
between appearing new card schemes and the 
European Commission on the compatibility 
with competition law of the MIFs they plan to 
charge. Guidance in the form of a regulation 
might even be considered as the ultima ratio 
(European Central Bank, 2010).
The remainder of this study is structured as 
follows: Section 2 provides stylised facts and 
ﬁ   gures on the cards market, determining the 
signiﬁ   cance of the card payments industry. 
Section 3 presents and reviews the underlying 
economic concepts and Section 4 provides a 
review of the literature on interchange fees. 
Section 5 presents the results of a fact-ﬁ  nding 
exercise on interchange fee arrangements, 
highlighting recent developments in, and 
determinants of, interchange fees in the euro 
area. Section 6 provides a legal assessment and 
comparison of some interchange fee decisions 
by EU and national competition authorities. 
Section 7 discusses possible policy options 
and perspectives for future market structures. 
The  ﬁ   nal section contains a summary and 
conclusion.8
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2  SIGNIFICANCE OF CARD PAYMENTS
The evolution of the different payment 
instruments and, in particular, the use of cards 
point to the important role card payments play 
in a well-functioning European payment system. 
A well-functioning ﬁ   nancial system allows 
an economy to fully exploit its growth potential, 
as it ensures that the best real investment 
opportunities receive the necessary funding 
(European Central Bank (2008)). Similar to other 
ﬁ   nancial innovations, cashless transactions 
make  ﬁ  nancial markets more complete, allow 
transaction costs to be low and, most importantly, 
facilitate the exchange of goods and services. 
Against this background, signiﬁ  cant changes in 
the use of cashless payments have taken place in 
the euro area over time; the number of cashless 
transactions, e.g. credit transfers, direct debits, 
card payments and e-money payments, has risen 
in all countries. Over the last few years, the 
volume of cashless payments in the euro area 
has increased by 6% per annum. In the euro 
area, as is shown in Chart 1, card payments 
experienced the highest growth in the period 
from 2000 to 2009, rising by about 10%, and 
have become the payment instrument used most 
in the euro area, with over 19 billion payments 
in 2009.3, 4
In particular, considering card payments in the 
euro area, the growth and development of the 
use of debit card payments over time was far 
stronger than that of credit card transactions, 
as shown in Chart 2.
19,131 billion transactions in the euro area in 2009. 3 
Chart 1 shows a positive difference between the number of card  4 
transactions and the sum total of all sub-groups, broken down 
by the function of card transactions, i.e. credit cards, debit 
cards, delayed debit, debit/delayed debit, credit/delayed debit. 
For example, the total of payments made using cards was above 
19 billion in 2009, while the total number of payments using 
the sum of payments broken down by card functions totalled 
only 12 billion transactions in 2009. In other words, there is 
difference as the “sum of the components” is not always equal 
to the “total”. The underlying reason is to be found in the fact 
that, although all the countries provide data on the totals, they 
do not all provide data on the sub-groups, so that there is no 
one-to-one correspondence between the sum of the components 
and the totals. The relatively large difference is due primarily to 
data from France, which does not provide any breakdown.
Chart 1 Use of payment instruments 


































Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
Chart 2 Debit versus credit card 
transactions in the euro area (2000-2009)
(in millions)



























Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.9
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2   SIGNIFICANCE OF 
CARD PAYMENTS
Despite a trend towards an increasing use of 
payment cards, the European retail payments 
market is still relatively fragmented and 
national payment habits differ, leading to 
substantial asymmetries in card payment usage. 
As shown in Chart 3, within the euro area, card 
payments were most frequently used in Finland, 
France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
In Greece and Italy, card payments are made 
least frequently. In effect, Greece and Italy have 
experienced the smallest increases in the number 
of card payment transactions per capita over the 
years. The highest growth in the use of cards for 
payments has been made by Slovakia, closely 
followed by the Netherlands and Malta. It is 
worth noting that, apart from the Netherlands, 
countries that have adopted the euro more 
recently have recorded relatively high growth 
rates in payment card usage.
In future, asymmetries in customers’ habits 
when purchasing goods and services are 
expected to diminish. More competition, more 
choice and new business opportunities, for 
example in the cards market, will inﬂ  uence 
payment habits and could encourage a greater 
use of cards. Innovative payment solutions, such 
as online payments, are also likely to change 
customers’ habits. Overall, recent developments 
and changes in the payments market reveal 
great opportunities and potential for non-cash 
payments, in particular for the cards market. 
Further replacement of cash by other payment 
instruments, including cards, is likely to beneﬁ  t 
proﬁ  tability, to entail economies of scale and, 
thereby, to enhance competition and overall 
economic efﬁ  ciency.
Chart 3 Number of card payment 














1  AT 
2  BE 
3  CY 
4  DE 
5  ES 
6  FI 
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8  GR 
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10  IT 
11  LU 
12  MT 
13  NL 
14  PT 
15  SI 
16  SK 
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Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
Note: The abbreviations AT, BE, CY, DE, ES, FI, GR, IE, IT, 
LU, MT, NL, PT, SI, SK are country codes for the following 
countries (listed in the same order): Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia.10
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3  INTERCHANGE FEES IN CARD PAYMENTS
The mechanism of interchange fees is a complex 
issue and involves many participants in the 
payment transaction chain. This section provides 
some stylised facts on the interplay of different 
actors in the cards market and introduces the 
economic background of interchange fees.
3.1  TWO-SIDED MARKETS AND INTERCHANGE 
FEES
Two-sided markets typically feature one or 
several platforms, such as a card scheme, which 
make interactions between end-users possible 
and try to bring the two sides “on board” by 
appropriately charging each side. Markets are 
two-sided if supply and demand on one side of 
the market are determined by supply and demand 
on the other side of that market, so that pricing 
should take into account both sides of the market. 
The payment card market is characterised by 
a two-sided market structure. Payment card 
schemes sell their services to two types of 
customers, namely (i) cardholders, who use their 
card (a) to buy goods and services from merchants 
that accept the card and/or (b) to withdraw cash 
from most automated teller machines (ATMs), 
and (ii) merchants, who offer their customers the 
possibility of paying with cards.
There are two main business models for the 
provision of card payments: three and four-party 
schemes, as illustrated in Chart 4. A three-party 
scheme is generally a commercial company 
that directly serves both sides of the market: 
cardholders and merchants. The scheme itself 
is responsible for issuing cards and acquiring 
transactions. A four-party scheme brings 
together multiple actors (normally banks), each 
of which may tend to specialise on either one 
or both sides of the market: as issuer serving 
the cardholders, or as acquirers serving the 
merchants. The scheme may be administered 
by a non-proﬁ  t organisation or a commercial 
company. In the EU, for example, three-party 
schemes are American Express and Diner’s 
Club, and four-party schemes comprise Visa 
Europe, MasterCard and Cartes Bancaires. 
It should be noted that the three-party schemes 
are primarily credit card schemes. The four-
party schemes are debit and credit card schemes, 
while the debit function is the most dominant. 
In the following, particular attention is paid to 
four-party schemes.
An interchange fee is a transfer of funds from 
one side of the market to the other, as in Chart 5. 
It should also be noted that some schemes work 
without any kind of interchange fee, with each 
leg of the payment covering its own costs.
Chart 4 Business models for the provision of card payments
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3   INTERCHANGE  FEES 
IN CARD PAYMENTS
In four-party schemes, an interchange fee can 
be, and usually is, explicitly provided for in 
the scheme rules. Three-party schemes also 
involve some kind of transfer of funds from the 
acquiring side to the issuing side, usually an 
implicit interchange fee. In the classic model, 
the interchange fee goes from the acquiring side 
to the issuing side, but it can sometimes also 
take the opposite direction.
In the dominant model, every time a card 
payment is made, the issuer (on behalf of the 
cardholder) is instructed to pay the acquirer 
(on behalf of the merchant) for the value of 
the goods or services. The card issuing and the 
acquiring sides of the business are normally 
performed by banks. The interchange fee 
typically  ﬂ   ows in the opposite direction: 
it is paid by the acquirer to the issuer. 
In other words, interchange fees are basically a 
balancing mechanism through which some of 
the costs on the issuing side are covered by the 
acquiring side.
In 2006 there were at least four national card 
schemes that operated without an MIF, namely 
those in Denmark,5 Finland, Luxemburg 6 and 
the Netherlands.7
Interchange fees are only one component. 
Besides interchange fees, there are up to four 
additional fees to be found in a four-party card 
scheme, namely the merchant fee, the cardholder 
fee and two scheme fees. The acquirer charges 
the merchant a fee 8 and can thus recover the 
interchange fee paid to the issuer. Interchange 
fees are usually the main component of the 
merchant’s service commission. Merchants 
also need to recover the costs paid to acquirers. 
To this end, they could increase the general 
level of prices or – if not prevented from 
doing so by the schemes rules or national 
legislation – they could charge cardholders 
more (i.e. impose a “surcharge”) if accepting 
card payments is more expensive for them than 
accepting other payment instruments such as 
cash. The cardholder fee is typically a ﬁ  xed 
monthly or annual fee paid by the cardholder to 
the card issuing bank. In addition to interchange 
fees, the merchant fee and the cardholder fee, 
four-party schemes typically have “scheme 
fees”. These are fees that card schemes charge 
both to issuers and to acquirers. These fees are 
related to membership in the scheme and are 
generally based on the number of cards issued 
and/or the number of transactions carried out 
(acquisition).
3.2  ECONOMICS OF INTERCHANGE FEES
MAXIMISING AGGREGATE PROFIT FOR CARD 
SCHEME MEMBERS
The cards industry is characterised by two 
features: the need to serve a two-sided market, 
i.e. cardholders and merchants, and the network 
externalities related to both sides of the market, 
i.e. the beneﬁ  t accrued by merchants when more 
people have a card and, similarly, the beneﬁ  t 
cardholders have when they can use their cards 
for payments to more merchants.
It should be noted that Dankort works without an MIF in the  5 
traditional sense. However, Nets, and its predecessor PBS, acts as 
the only acquirer and all merchants pay a ﬁ  xed fee that depends 
on the number of transactions submitted to Nets. Subsequently, 
Nets pays the issuers, the banks, a fee per Dankort transaction. 
The size of the merchant fee, and thus the fee from Nets to the 
issuers, is regulated. If that were not the case, it would be quite 
similar to an MIF.
The situation may change in Luxembourg with the upcoming  6 
decommissioning of the national debit card scheme Bancomat in 
early 2012.
For detailed explanations of MIFs, see European Commission,  7 
“Report on the retail banking sector inquiry”, Commission 
Staff Working Document, January 2007, p. 112 (available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/
inquiries/sec_2007_106.pdf).
Referred to as the “merchant service charge” (MSC) in European  8 
literature, while US literature uses the term “discount fee” (DF).
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Card schemes set prices to maximise the 
aggregate proﬁ  t for their members. To this end, 
two decisions need to be taken with respect to 
the price level and the price structure. The price 
level refers to the aggregate price charged by the 
card scheme to the two sides. The price structure 
relates to the sharing of the total income between 
the two sides of the market. The price structure 
in card payments is normally determined such 
that merchants pay a larger share of the aggregate 
price than the cardholders. Cardholders may on 
certain occasions even enjoy a price gain (i.e. a 
“subsidy”) for having and using their card. This 
would be the case when they are not charged any 
annual fee and they obtain beneﬁ  ts from using the 
card, e.g. airline miles, cash reimbursements, etc.
There are many examples of two-sided markets 
where the costs are not allocated evenly to 
both types of clients. Newspapers generally 
sell to readers at prices that are lower than the 
production costs, while a large proportion of 
the revenue is collected from advertisers. 
A newspaper may even be free of charge for 
readers and recover its costs entirely from 
advertisers. But this does not extend to readers 
being paid for obtaining the newspaper. 
The imbalance in the way card schemes allocate 
costs and obtain their income is caused by the 
lower price elasticity on the merchants’ side. 
A low price elasticity means that the merchants’ 
demand for a given card scheme is affected 
relatively little by changes in prices. In other 
words, card schemes can afford to raise the prices 
they charge to merchants in order to maximise 
the proﬁ  t for their members. Low price elasticity 
is due mainly to the fact that accepting card 
payments has become a necessity for merchants 
in many business sectors, e.g. hotels, restaurants, 
petrol stations, supermarkets.9 
The price elasticity of merchants in accepting 
card payments has never been researched. 
However, the difference in price elasticity 
of consumers vis-à-vis that of merchants 
is a key element in explaining and studying 
interchange fees and assuming that there is a 
difference in price elasticity is plausible.
Substitutes for a given card scheme certainly 
exist. The merchant may offer customers 
the possibility of paying with other payment 
instruments, including other cards. Customers 
who cannot pay with their preferred card 
will normally accept paying with a different 
payment instrument. However, the merchant 
might not wish to risk losing a sale, e.g. in cases 
where the customer does not have alternative 
means of payment, or losing future sales, e.g. if 
the customer is annoyed because the merchant 
will not accept the card. 
Therefore, the willingness of the merchant to 
take the risk of not accepting a well-known and 
widespread card scheme will depend on two 
factors. The ﬁ  rst is the question as to whether the 
“cost” is in proportion to the “income”, i.e. whether 
the cost of the merchant fee is high or low in 
comparison with the proﬁ  t margin lost as a result 
of a foregone sale.10 The second is determined by 
the card scheme’s acceptance and overall coverage 
within the business sector and, consequently, the 
customers’ expectations with respect to their card.
When setting the prices in a four-party scheme, 
the card scheme needs to take into account the 
demand curves of both the merchants and the 
cardholders at the same time.11 In such a scheme, 
the proﬁ  t-maximising scheme takes into account 
both the price elasticity of demand on both sides 
of the market and the externalities caused by 
the demand on one side of the market to that on 
the other. In particular, it needs to balance the 
following considerations:
An increase (decrease) in merchant fees    •
may, in theory, decrease (increase) the 
demand for card services by merchants and – 
Recent studies have shown that consumers are price sensitive.  9 
See, for example, Amromin et al. (2005), Ching and Hayashi 
(2008), Humphrey et al. (2001) and Zinman (2008). Bolt et al. 
(2010) provide evidence of the price sensitivity of Dutch 
consumers with respect to debit card services.
For this reason, merchants operating with low margins tend  10 
not to accept credit cards, while merchants operating with high 
margins tend to accept them.
It should be noted that in a three-party scheme, the scheme sets  11 
the prices for the cardholder and the merchant, while in four-party 
scheme, the card scheme only sets a default interchange fee.13
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3   INTERCHANGE  FEES 
IN CARD PAYMENTS through the network externality – cause a 
decrease (increase) in cardholders’ demand 
for card services.
An increase (decrease) in cardholder fees    •
may, in theory, decrease (increase) the 
demand for card services by cardholders and – 
through the network externality – cause a 
decrease (increase) in merchants’ demand 
for card services.
The price structure of a card scheme would be 
optimal if the total proﬁ  t for the card scheme 
members is maximised. The price structure 
depends on the respective price elasticities 
in that the side of the market with lower price 
elasticity of demand has higher prices than the 
side with higher price elasticity of demand. 
As the elasticity of demand for merchants in card 
payments is lower than that for cardholders, the 
prices for merchants are higher than the prices 
for cardholders. Ensuring that an optimal number 
of cardholders join a card programme may even 
necessitate a “negative price”. Another way 
of reducing the price for cardholders, instead 
of cash pay-backs, is to bundle other services 
together on the payment card. This is especially 
relevant if the perceived value of these services 
for customers exceeds the issuers’ cost thereof. 
In addition to payment services, international 
credit cards also offer insurance, concierge 
and other value-added services that come to 
cardholders with the card.
Typically, the interchange fee in a four-party 
scheme is set by the card association, which is 
generally owned by the issuers and acquirers,12 
both also being represented in the association’s 
board. The prices set to maximise total proﬁ  ts 
may not be the same as those that maximise the 
proﬁ   ts of the scheme’s individual members, 
i.e. the issuers and acquirers. In such a case, 
the bargaining powers of the issuers and 
acquirers in the scheme’s governance affect the 
interchange fee that is chosen. Such internal 
bargaining may thus cause the interchange 
fee actually charged to differ from the 
individual optimum.
Moreover, in practice, pricing is also largely 
determined by the price elasticity of the issuing 
banks. When setting its interchange fees, the 
card scheme will not pay much attention to the 
price elasticity of cardholders, but would rather 
take into account the price elasticity of issuing 
banks. Issuers’ decisions on which card to issue 
depend on the level of the interchange fee. This 
elasticity can be very marked and may induce 
issuing banks to switch to another card provider 
with higher interchange fees. The question as 
to whether competition between card schemes 
drives up prices may need to be assessed in 
terms of the expected interchange fee revenues 
determined by overall card acceptance and 
usage.
COMPETITION BETWEEN ISSUERS AND ACQUIRERS 
WITHIN A GIVEN CARD SCHEME
In the event of perfect competition between 
schemes, the prices offered to cardholders and 
merchants would be calculated as follows:
merchants: marginal cost of serving merchants 
± interchange fee;
cardholders: marginal cost of serving 
cardholders ± interchange fee.
The actual prices also depend on the level of 
competition in the issuing and acquiring markets. 
A lack of competition between both issuers and 
acquirers can move the price level away from 
the efﬁ  cient level by allocating increased costs 
to either of the two sides of the market.
Card schemes consist of a group of sellers on 
the issuing and acquiring side that have agreed 
on common rules for providing the service and 
take decisions jointly. Through the interchange 
fee, they collectively decide on the lower bounds 
of the prices that acquirers charge merchants 
and issuers charge cardholders. Although there 
are similarities in the modus operandi, there are 
also important differences between card schemes 
Typically, all acquirers are issuers, but many issuers are not  12 
acquirers.14
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and cartels.13 Like a cartel, a successful four-
party scheme has the potential to reduce 
competition between schemes. Network 
externalities often make it more attractive for a 
bank to join a four-party scheme than to be 
issuer and acquirer for its own card brand. 
However, competition within the scheme exists 
in the issuing and acquiring markets. Another 
very important difference is that a cartel often 
seeks to raise prices by restricting output, while 
card schemes seek to maximise their output, 
and interchange fees support this objective. 
Furthermore, an important difference is also to 
be found in the fact that a card scheme needs to 
serve both sides of the payment market, while a 
“classic” cartel serves only a one-sided market.
Gauging if and to what extent interchange 
fees affect the degree of competition between 
issuers, or between acquirers, one needs to 
take into consideration that the interchange fee 
acts like an indirect tax that all acquirers are 
equally bound to impose on their customers, the 
merchants. At ﬁ  rst sight, this does not seem to 
have an impact on internal competition between 
acquirers. However, the interchange fee affects 
the incentives for members to specialise as 
acquirers or issuers, because it transfers revenue 
from the former to the latter. In this way, it affects 
the number of competing issuers/acquirers.
CONTESTABILITY OF THE CARD SCHEME MARKET
Network externalities substantially limit the 
contestability of the card scheme market. Once 
cards of a given card scheme are to be found in 
many consumers’ wallets and once acceptance 
of that card scheme has become generalised 
within a given sector of business, it becomes 
very difﬁ  cult to reverse this situation. Given 
that merchants’ price elasticity is low and that 
demand for card services is little affected by 
changes in prices, interchange fees can be 
set sufﬁ  ciently high. Under these conditions, 
issuers may offer cardholders negative prices. 
Choosing from among several payment 
instruments, cardholders will use their card to 
pay for goods in order to beneﬁ  t from those 
negative prices.
For example, if a credit card provides for a cash 
reimbursement of 1%, the effective price for 
the cardholder of a good costing 100 will be 99 
if he/she pays with the credit card, and 100 if 
he/she pays with cash or debit card. A competing 
card scheme wishing to enter the market 
would have to offer lower prices to induce 
cardholders to switch their preferred payment 
instrument, for example, a cash reimbursement 
of 2%. Such a policy would require increasing 
interchange fees. However, as it has not yet 
attained widespread acceptance, this new card 
scheme would be incapable of imposing a price 
on merchants that provides for the necessary 
level of interchange fees.
The efﬁ   cient price structure is likely to 
change in the course of the lifetime of the 
scheme, as the elasticities of demand and 
network externalities change with the usage 
of the scheme. At the outset, the elasticities 
of merchants and cardholders may be higher, 
as neither need the card as much as when the 
scheme has established itself. In sum, the more 
widespread a card scheme becomes, the higher it 
can set interchange fees, the more opportunities 
it provides issuers to reduce the prices offered 
to cardholders to negative levels and the more 
cardholders will make use of the card. Network 
externalities are a reinforcing mechanism.
MARKET FAILURE AND REGULATORY ASPECTS
In principle, there are two ways in which markets 
that provide card payments can fail. First, the 
price level may be above the socially efﬁ  cient 
one. The market power of providers on either 
or both sides of the market may enable them to 
extract rents, i.e. charge their customers more 
A cartel can be seen as a group of sellers of a product who have  13 
joined forces to control the production, sale and price of that 
product in the hope of obtaining the advantages of a monopoly. 
Actually, the outcome may not be a monopoly, but rather a 
situation in which the group has a dominant market power. 
The more ﬁ  rms enter the market, the more will the price gradually 
drop from the monopoly level to the welfare-maximising level. 
In economic theory, cartels are generally considered to be inferior 
to competition, and there is little material in economic literature 
to justify them. Whether they are allowed to exist depends on the 
policies of the relevant competition and antitrust authorities.15
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3   INTERCHANGE  FEES 
IN CARD PAYMENTS than the competitive price. Second, the price 
structure may differ from the socially optimum 
one, i.e. merchant and cardholder welfare is not 
maximised on the basis of the relative prices 
charged by the card payment provider.
It should be noted that excessive interchange 
fees may have two negative effects. The ﬁ  rst 
is an allocative effect. When merchants decide 
whether or not to accept cards, they not only take 
their own direct beneﬁ  ts from card acceptance 
into account (e.g. cost savings relative to cash 
payments), but also consider the beneﬁ  ts  of 
cardholders. This is because card acceptance 
is a desirable service that attracts customers. 
This internalisation of cardholder beneﬁ  ts 
implies that schemes can push interchange fees 
very high without jeopardising card acceptance.
The economic literature (e.g. Rochet and 
Tirole (2002, 2011)) has shown that this allows 
schemes to introduce “hidden costs” into the 
system. When a payment is made with a high 
interchange fee card, cardholders impose a 
negative externality on the merchant and, hence, 
all other purchasers. Cardholders are tempted 
to use more expensive payment cards, because 
their high interchange fee is often reimbursed 
via low cardholder fees and reward programmes. 
In doing so, they do not take into account the 
genuine costs of the payment, which is to a large 
extent borne by the merchant and other shoppers. 
Rather than internalising positive externalities 
for merchants, excessive interchange fees 
therefore create negative externalities.
The second negative effect that can arise is a 
distributive effect. It has often been argued that 
the pass-through of interchange fee income from 
issuers to cardholders takes place at a lower 
rate than the pass-through of interchange fee 
costs from acquirers to merchants. With such 
an asymmetric pass-through, schemes have an 
incentive to use the interchange fee to affect 
the price structure of payment card markets so 
as to maximise output. In addition, it would be 
commercially proﬁ   table for them to raise the 
interchange fee to a higher level in order to 
shift revenues to the side of the market where 
the pass-through is low (issuing), while costs 
are shifted to the side of the market where the 
pass-through is high (acquiring). In this way, 
they can increase banks’ joint proﬁ  t  margins 
across issuing and acquiring, which allows 
rents to be extracted from consumers. With 
such an asymmetric pass-through, a reduction 
of the interchange fee must decrease the price 
level across issuing and acquiring, because the 
original interchange fee set by the scheme could 
otherwise not have been proﬁ  t-maximising.
Competition laws affect the price structure of 
four-party schemes, due to their multilateral 
nature. Antitrust policy is normally the competence 
of competition authorities. Competition laws 
restrict the ability of four-party schemes 
(consisting of competing entities) to set a privately 
optimal price structure. The goal of competition 
law is an efﬁ   cient and competitive market, 
without restrictive agreements between entities. 
Their ability to succeed in attaining this goal will 
depend on the application and interpretation of 
competition rules.
It is sometimes argued that the reduction of 
interchange fees due to the application of the 
competition rules is likely to result in higher 
prices or a reduction of reward programmes for 
cardholders. Arguably, this depends on a number 
of factors, such as the level of the actual fee, 
the level of competition in the issuing market, 
the magnitude of the reduction, the current 
level of fees and rewards, etc., and possible 
cross-subsidising between banking services. 
In addition, issuing banks may make the actual 
use of cards by cardholders subject to certain 
conditions. Therefore, it is difﬁ  cult to anticipate 
the effect that a decrease in interchange fees will 
have on the issuing banks’ business case with 
respect to cards.
Another question that arises is that as to whether 
a decrease in interchange fees also results in 
lower prices for merchants. This may, but 
is not necessarily the case. For a reduction 
of interchange fees to be passed through to 
merchants, the market for acquiring needs 
to be competitive. The more competitive the 16
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acquiring market is, the more of the reduced 
costs (for acquirers) are passed on to merchants. 
As a consequence, a reduction in interchange 
fee transfers wealth either from cardholders or 
issuers to merchants or acquirers – depending 
on the degree to which issuers and acquirers 
pass the increase in costs (issuers) or decrease in 
costs (acquirers) on to the side they serve.
The assessment of the compliance of multilateral 
interchange fees (MIFs) with EU competition 
law primarily requires an analysis whether the 
MIF arrangement violates Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).
The merchant indifference test (also called 
the tourist test), as applied by the European 
Commission in assessing the undertakings 
offered by MasterCard and the commitments 
offered by Visa Europe, is described in further 
detail in Section 4. An assessment of some 
interchange fee decisions by competition 
authorities is provided in Section 6.17
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Over recent years, economic analysis has 
brought forth an enormous number of theoretical 
contributions on issues falling into the ﬁ  eld 
of interchange fees. The interest in modelling 
interchange fees is related to two prevailing 
issues in the debate on interchange fees: the 
question as to whether and how interchange fees 
really ensure efﬁ  ciency in the payment market 
and that as to whether and how interchange fees 
alter competition.
What is of key interest both in terms of economic 
modelling and from a regulatory perspective is 
to determine whether the current interchange 
fee patterns are socially optimal, i.e. whether the 
various payment instruments will be overused 
or underused relative to a socially optimum 
outcome (Prager et al. (2009)). Both at a policy 
level and at an academic level, it has been 
argued that an increase in the use of electronic 
payment instruments would reduce the social 
costs of payments. However, the cash will only 
be replaced by card payments if consumers 
and merchants have incentives to do so. Thus, 
MIFs have been designed to provide incentives 
for the use of electronic payment instruments 
(Leinonen (2007); and Verdier (2009)).
A number of important ﬁ   ndings that have 
emerged in the theoretical literature deserve 
mention in the context of policy debate on 
competition in retail payment systems, in 
general, and on setting MIFs in the cards 
business, in particular (Rochet (2007)).
The models that have been developed thus far 
include the contributions of Baxter (1983), 
Carlton and Frankel (1995), Schmalensee (2002), 
Chang and Evans (2000), Wright (2004), Evans 
(2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Rochet 
and Wright (2008), and Rochet and Tirole (2003, 
2006, 2011). Common to these contributions 
is the concept of two-sided markets. Under 
certain conditions, one side of the market will 
pay relatively less than the other side or, in the 
extreme, will not pay anything for the service. 
In other words, the pricing distribution is 
skewed on account of some positive indirect 
network externalities in the market (Evans and 
Schmalensee (2005)). The market for retail 
payment instruments is a two-sided market. 
Interchange fees are designed to lead to lower 
cardholder fees: consumers are given an incentive 
to move away from the use of cash and cheques 
to more efﬁ  cient means of payment. Therefore, 
the balancing nature of interchange fees is a 
fundamental prerequisite for the successful 
functioning of retail payment systems.
Baxter (1983) was the ﬁ   rst to justify the 
existence of interchange fees, claiming that they 
are needed to deal with market failures caused 
by the existence of externalities in the market. 
However, Baxter’s model has been challenged 
because of its too simplistic assumptions on 
the homogeneity of consumers and merchants. 
In reality, consumers and merchants differ in 
terms of their card usage and card acceptance, 
and there can be strategic interaction among 
merchants that alters the acceptance of cards 
(Rochet and Tirole (2006); and Verdier (2009)). 
Wright (2004) improved the model by assuming 
heterogeneity in both sides of the market, so that 
the volume-maximising interchange fee is chosen 
such that it brings the demand in the two sides of 
the market into balance. Here, the classic feature 
of a two-sided market (Rochet and Tirole (2006)) 
becomes evident. The model explicitly takes into 
account the asymmetry between the two sides 
of the market, considering the differences in the 
price elasticity of cardholders and merchants.
A variant of these models examines the 
relationship between the level of the interchange 
fee and the quality of the payment system 
services. According to Verdier (2006), the 
level of quality of the payment system should 
be a factor to be taken into consideration 
when choosing the optimal interchange fee. 
Furthermore, there seems to be evidence that 
card system operators and bank associations have 
an interest in inﬂ  ating interchange fees. This may 
not be bad from a social welfare point of view, 
but only to the limited extent that banks need to 
use those revenues to recover their high ﬁ  xed 18
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costs for ensuring the safety of, and innovations 
in, their payment networks. On the other hand, 
revenues from interchange fees may be used in an 
excessive and socially not most efﬁ  cient manner.
Bolt and Schmiedel (2011) conclude that 
increased competition between card schemes 
drives down merchant fees and increases card 
acceptance. Recent data on the development 
of interchange fee levels support an overall 
decreasing trend in different European countries. 
Moreover, from a European perspective, 
consumers and merchants are likely to beneﬁ  t 
from the creation of SEPA when sufﬁ  cient 
competition in the card payments market 
alleviates potentially monopolistic tendencies.
Thus, in sum, there is general academic 
consensus on why interchange fees exist, 
irrespective of whether they are agreed 
bilaterally or multilaterally. The existence of 
such fees seems to hold even in mature payment 
card systems that take into account that payment 
networks are driven by usage, rather than by 
membership externalities.
Concerns arise with respect to the determination 
of the socially optimal interchange fee. In 
fact, part of the literature maintains that the 
trade-off between a consumers’ surplus and a 
merchants’ surplus should be taken into account 
when dealing with heterogeneous markets 
(Verdier (2009)). When heterogeneity is 
considered, there can be an underuse or overuse 
of card payments from the point of view of 
the social planner. If that is taken as given, the 
volume-maximising, the proﬁ  t-maximising and 
the welfare-maximising interchange fees are not 
equal (Schmalensee (2002); Wright (2004); and 
Rochet and Tirole (2006)).
One of the problems with respect to the setting of 
interchange fees both for private agents and for 
regulators is that they cannot rely on empirical 
studies. Although a large number of theoretical 
models on interchange fees have been put 
forward in the literature, these formal models 
have not been subjected consistently to empirical 
tests. The empirical studies mostly relate to the 
different costs of various payment instruments. 
However, most of them differ signiﬁ  cantly in 
the approaches and deﬁ  nitions used. One of the 
main problems in empirical analysis is linked 
to the core issue in the payments market: the 
replacement of cash with electronic payment 
instruments. It is not clear how to deﬁ  ne the 
full costs of all payment instruments, given 
the difﬁ   culty in estimating the cost of cash 
(Leinonen (2007); and Verdier (2009)).
However, there is one recent empirical work that 
is worth mentioning. Chakravorti et al. (2009) 
have looked at the effect of ceilings on multilateral 
exchange fees in Spain in the period from 1997 
to 2007. They argue that consumer and merchant 
welfare improved when the interchange fees were 
dropped in Spain, following a private agreement 
between the parties in conﬂ  ict.  Furthermore, 
bank revenues increased because the increase in 
the number of transactions offset the decrease in 
the revenue per transaction. However, a potential 
side effect of reducing interchange fees remains 
unsettled as the issuing banks may demand and 
charge the ﬁ   nal consumer higher card fees to 
recover foregone revenues from multilateral 
exchange fees.
This brief review of the literature shows that 
determining which pattern of fees is socially 
optimal is a difﬁ  cult task. There seems to be 
consensus on why interchange fees exist in the 
market for debit and credit cards. However, both 
the issue of the allocation of costs and beneﬁ  ts 
and potential economic effects of a ceiling on 
such fees in the market for card payments are 
key matters that are still under discussion among 
academics and banks (issuers and acquirers).
However, there is a need for more extensive 
empirical research. Moreover, it is worthwhile 
to say some words on new models, the 
so-called “tourist test” models, that have been 
developed to take into account some aspects 
that previous research had failed to consider and 
that have been followed by market agents and 
regulatory authorities. In the MasterCard case 
(Case No Comp/34.579), after more than a year 
of discussions on the reduction of multilateral 19
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LITERATURE exchange fees on cross-border payments, 
MasterCard decided to calculate these fees on 
the basis of this new methodology, which led to 
a substantial reduction of fees. 
One of the main shortcomings of previous 
models is the strategic interaction among 
merchants. There is competition among 
merchants in attracting costumers. They are 
aware of the fact that the decision to accept 
cards will have an impact on competition, so that 
they may be willing to accept higher fees if they 
have advantages in terms of competition. This 
is called the “must-take card” concern (Vickers 
(2005); and Rochet and Tirole (2008)).
Antitrust authorities claim that merchants 
cannot refuse to accept cards because that 
would mean losing clients and this pushes up 
the level of the interchange fees chosen by the 
payment platform (Verdier (2009)). This can 
imply ex post market inefﬁ  ciency, in the sense 
that merchants may refuse a card payment from 
a costumer even if they had declared ex ante 
that they would accept cards. 
This can be made clearer on the basis of a simple 
example: suppose that a non-repeat customer 
decides to have dinner at a restaurant on the last 
day of his/her holidays; when he/she gets the bill, 
he/she hands over his/her card, but the proprietor 
informs him/her that he does not accept cards, 
so that the customer either has to have cash or 
needs to ﬁ  nd an ATM.
 The main point here is that it may well be that 
the restaurant did have a properly working card 
terminal, but the proprietor decided to ask for 
cash because it was less costly, also given the 
fact that the costumer was a one-off costumer. If 
the main component of the merchant fee, i.e. the 
interchange fee, had been lower, he might have 
been willing to accept the card payment.
Put differently, the “tourist test” is a measure 
of the level of the interchange fee that would 
make merchants indifferent to which payment 
instrument is used, ensuring that interchange fees 
are not raised to such a high level that negative 
usage externalities are introduced into the system. 
If interchange fees are too high, merchants may 
still accept cards to attract customers. However, 
once the non-repeat customer is inside the shop, 
the merchant has an incentive to steer the customer 
to cheaper means of payment. Such customer 
steering only occurs if cards have been priced 
too high and above the transactional beneﬁ  ts of 
merchants. Hence, the tourist test is failed because 
there are hidden costs in the system.
This is the main idea behind the so-called 
tourist-test model. Roughly speaking, the main 
question behind the tourist test is how to make 
merchants accept a card payment if the costumer 
is also able to pay in cash or, in other words, the 
question as to whether and to what extent cards 
are more expensive than cash. 
The ﬁ  rst to consistently develop the model were 
Rochet and Tirole (2006). They constructed a 
model to create a benchmark for interchange fees. 
They focus on the merchant’s avoided-cost when 
a cash payment is replaced by a card payment. The 
merchant fee will pass the tourist test if accepting 
the card payment does not raise the merchant’s 
operating costs (Rochet and Tirole (2006)). 
Starting from this basic model, they improved 
it by considering various, more general 
assumptions, such as the internalisation by 
merchants of cardholders’ surpluses and 
heterogeneity among merchants, to verify under 
what conditions the test gives unbiased results 
(Rochet and Tirole (2011)). They compare the 
maximum interchange fee that passes the tourist 
test with that which maximises the joint surplus 
and the overall welfare. They conclude that the 
tourist test is a reliable tool in the case of constant 
issuer margins and homogeneous merchants 
(Rochet and Tirole (2011)). Under different 
contingencies, the results of the test may be less 
reliable than in the case mentioned above.
Overall, this new methodology currently seems 
to be a preferred approach that may help in 
determining those interchange fees that will 
promote the use of more efﬁ  cient  payment 
instruments and prevent abuses in the market.20
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IN THE EU
This section presents the results of the fact-
ﬁ  nding exercise on the structure of, and recent 
developments in, MIFs for card payments at the 
EU level. It also presents different interchange 
fee models and alternative arrangements.
5.1  FACT-FINDING ON INTERCHANGE FEE 
ARRANGEMENTS
Recently, the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) has carried out a fact-ﬁ  nding 
exercise and collected relevant information on 
interchange fees for card payments in Europe 
so as to increase its understanding of national 
practices, experiences and developments in the 
ﬁ  eld of interchange fees in card payments at the 
EU level. The survey focused on the interchange 
fees applied to debit and credit card transactions. 
Potential interchange fees on cash withdrawals 
via ATMs were not covered by the exercise. For 
this exercise, 26 of the 27 EU member countries 
participated in the survey. All data reported for 
this exercise refer to the year 2010.
The fact-ﬁ  nding exercise showed that interchange 
fees are not set and applied in a harmonised way 
in the EU. The choice, structure, and level of 
interchange fees applied in the European payment 
card markets differ in many ways and depend 
on a number of options and dimensions. At the 
domestic level in many countries, interchange 
fees are set bilaterally or multilaterally by 
domestic card schemes.
In cases where there is no domestic card scheme 
serving the country’s home market, national 
card markets are generally served by Visa 
Europe and/or MasterCard. In the card systems 
operated by Visa Europe and MasterCard, 
the fees applied to domestic transactions 
are determined either by national banking 
associations operating under the scheme’s “ﬂ  ag” 
or by Visa Europe and MasterCard themselves 
at an EU level. Apart from domestic fees, both 
Visa Europe and MasterCard also ﬁ  x  cross-
border fees. These cross-border fees generally 
also apply by “default” in domestic situations 
if no bilateral or multilateral agreements (in the 
case of transactions within EU countries) are in 
place. The level of fees on debit and credit card 
payments typically differ.
Across European countries, the level of 
interchange fees varies signiﬁ  cantly.  The 
table provides an overview of interchange 
fees charged for a €10 and a €100 debit card 
transaction. Overall, it can be seen that the 
maximum interchange fee for such transactions 
can be substantial. Typically, interchange fees are 
reviewed periodically, on an annual or bi-annual 
basis, by the respective scheme’s governance 
body.
In many countries, interchange fees have 
been decreasing over time. This holds true 
of, for example, Belgium, Estonia, France, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. Chart 6 reports the 
development of the effective average MIF 
for point of sale (POS) transactions in Spain 
in the period from 2000 to 2009. As a result 
of successive cross-industry agreements, 
interchange fees for card payments have 
gradually been decreasing since 1999. However, 
this trend accelerated signiﬁ  cantly in 2005. Thus, 
maximum interchange fees dropped by 21% in 
absolute terms between 1999 and 2002, starting 
Overview of minimum debit card interchange 
fees for €10 and €100 transactions in 2010
Interchange fees Amount debit card transaction
€ 10 € 100
Maximum [EUR] 0.30 1.55
Minimum [EUR] 0.01 0.01
Average [EUR] 0.10 0.47
Standard deviation 0.07 0.47
Number of reporting 
countries 20.0 20.0
Source: European System of Central Banks.
Notes: An attempt was made to calculate and provide an 
overview of credit card interchange fees for €10 and €100 
transactions. However, data unavailability and the incomplete 
information available on such fees in a number of countries made 
it impossible for fees on credit card transactions to be reported 
here. The available results could be biased because of missing 
or not available data on domestic credit card fees. It should be 
noted that there is a ﬂ  oor interchange fee for government and 
utilities transactions in Greece. In this case, the minimum ﬁ  gure 
overrides the average minimum fee that is used in this table. For 
further details, please also see Annex 1.21
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from a level of about 3.5%. Until the end of 2005, 
interchange fees continued to decrease, albeit 
at a slower pace. Finally, following the above-
mentioned agreement, an additional adjustment 
took place, driving average MIFs down further, 
namely by 43% for inter-scheme operations and 
by 35% for intra-scheme transactions. Chart 4 
presents the evolution of overall yearly weighted 
average MIF values for intra-scheme and 
inter-scheme transactions in Spain.
Chart 7 depicts the development of average 
interchange fees in Portugal over time. 
The values reﬂ  ect the calculation of the average 
MIF charged, considering all purchases at 
POSs of the Multibanco network. The average 
MIF applied in transactions on the Multibanco 
network reached its highest level in 2004, 
standing at 0.76%. The level of interchange fees 
then steadily decreased to stabilise at 0.58% 
between 2007 and 2009. In 2010, the level of 
interchange fees stood at 0.57%, representing its 
second lowest level over the past nine years. The 
overall decrease was due mainly to increased 
competition with international card payment 
schemes and to favourable market developments, 
i.e. the evolution of card payments in the overall 
market and in core segments thereof. However, 
at the aggregate level, this needs also to be 
seen against the background of positive market 
growth in terms of card issuance and card usage 
in general.
In Germany, a standard interchange fee applies 
to payments using the national card scheme 
“electronic cash”. Although the fee level 
has basically remained unchanged since its 
introduction, negotiations between certain 
retailers and the banking community recently 
resulted in a tendency towards lower fees.
In the United Kingdom, interchange fees for 
credit/charge card purchase transactions have 
tended to decrease, especially for chip/PIN 
transactions, while those for immediate debit card 
purchase transactions have tended to increase, 
mainly on account of so-called interim payment 
guarantee charges. Competition between VISA 
Chart 6 Effective average multilateral 
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Source: European System of Central Banks.
Notes: Since 2006, domestic interchange fees in Spain no longer 
differentiate between business sectors, but rather between 
turnover values and card transaction types. As a result, the 
ﬁ   gures above represent aggregated average fee levels and 
merely provide an illustrative picture of the actual evolution 
of interchange fees in the country (see the Banco de España’s 
website for more detailed information).
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and MasterCard to attract issuing banks may also 
have led to an increase in the MIF levels.
In Slovenia, domestic interchange fees were 
not changed very frequently in recent years and 
have basically remained stable at the same level 
for the last 15 years, with the exception of one 
scheme where the level of interchange fees rose 
by 16.7% in 2007.
Overall, there has been a trend towards decreasing 
the fee levels in different countries, which 
mainly reﬂ  ects efﬁ  ciency gains from economies 
of scale and technological improvements over 
time, cross-industry arrangements and, in some 
cases, the involvement of public authorities. 
At the aggregate level, however, this decrease in 
MIFs needs to be seen against the background of 
positive market growth in terms of card issuance 
and card usage in general.
However, in cases where public authorities have 
been involved in lowering the interchange fee, 
some card schemes argue that this is generating 
losses for member banks and that it may lead to 
the disappearance of the scheme. Some national 
schemes have different interchange fees for 
different economic sectors, types of payment 
card (e.g. debit card versus credit card) and 
types of transaction (e.g. paper-based, electronic 
or combinations of both). For example, 
the domestic card payment schemes in Denmark, 
Germany, Malta, Romania, Portugal and 
Slovenia provide for differentiated interchange 
fees, depending on the merchant and business 
sector, and on the type of card and transaction. 
Another dimension in the calculation of the 
interchange fee arises from the question as 
to whether the fees are set on a ﬁ  xed  basis, 
ad valorem, or as a combination of both. The 
choice of the fee structure has an impact on the 
usage of the card if the value of the transaction 
is taken into consideration. On the one hand, for 
example, a ﬁ  xed interchange fee that has to be 
paid by merchants has the potential to discourage 
the acceptance of cards for payments of small 
amounts. On the other hand, an ad valorem 
fee for higher transaction values or for highly 
taxed purchases such as petrol could result in 
the perception at the merchant that the merchant 
service charge to be paid and the service offered 
are not connected to one another.
5.2 ALTERNATIVE  APPROACHES
As shown earlier, interchange fees are present 
with different levels in most European card 
schemes. In addition to model interchange fees, 
alternative arrangements can be put in place 
with the aim of generating similar economic 
effects as interchange fees. The following three 
alternative mechanisms can be distinguished.
The ﬁ  rst alternative arrangement is the model of a 
single acquirer, where the card scheme provides 
for a single processor as acquirer. Under this 
arrangement, banks may only position themselves 
as card issuers and receive no revenues from 
interchange fees per transaction. However, as 
the owners of the scheme, card issuers may, 
through the realisation of proﬁ   ts, receive an 
income equivalent to what they would receive 
through interchange fees. The distribution of the 
rents received by issuers depends on membership 
quotas. Therefore, the remuneration of issuers 
differs from that based on interchange fees in that 
the issuers’ income does not depend directly on 
the usage of the card. 
In the Netherlands, the PIN scheme followed a 
single-acquirer policy until 2004, using Interpay 
as processor. However, the Dutch Competition 
Authority opposed that situation, so that banks 
also took over the card acquiring activity. 
Classic interchange fees were then introduced 
as a result. However, the Dutch interchange fees 
are based on bilateral agreements that preserve 
competition both between acquiring banks and 
between issuing banks. Belgium still has a single-
processor model in operation, with most of the 
transactions being acquired by Atos Worldline.
A second alternative is the approach of a direct 
fee paid by the merchant to the card issuer. This 
model is used, for example, in the Girocard 
scheme in Germany. In this scheme, the 
acquisition of transactions takes place through 23
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network providers and not through the banks of 
the merchants. The payment guarantee is given 
to the merchant directly by the issuer. While the 
merchant’s bank is only involved in the ﬁ  nal 
clearing operation, the network operator, the so-
called “Netzbetreiber”, routes the transaction 
directly to the issuer. In principle, the economic 
effect of the direct fee is the same as that of 
having an interchange fee.
What is known as a system of balanced 
participation of issuing and acquiring banks 
is a third alternative and means a situation in 
which the business share of each of the banks 
participating in the scheme is equal on the 
issuing side and on the acquiring side. The net 
effect of interchange fees will thus be zero. This 
was the case in Finland, within Pankkikortti. 
At the time of the launch of the scheme, fees 
were not deemed necessary, given a good 
balance of issuing and acquiring activities 
within each bank. This cooperative model is no 
longer in place. Lately, the growing dominance 
of international brands has brought competitive 
pressure to bear on interchange fees.
5.3  DETERMINANTS AND CONTRACTUAL 
ARRANGEMENTS
COMPONENTS OF INTERCHANGE FEES
In general, the level of interchange fees is 
set on the basis of a certain rationale in each 
country. Traditionally, the minimum common 
denominator in all cases is the reimbursement 
of certain costs incurred by the card issuer. 
Typically, three cost elements are taken into 
account in the case of debit card transactions, 
namely:
the operating costs, e.g. the cost of  1. 
processing, clearing and settlement, and 
accounting;
the costs for the payment guarantee for  2. 
merchants; and
the security costs, e.g. fraud prevention costs. 3. 
For credit card payments there are additional 
credit funding costs.
In Europe, there are different national practices 
for, and experiences in, determining the exact 
fee level. In France, for example, the French 
Competition Authority has deﬁ  ned the calculation 
of the MIF as a mix of cost-based and incentive-
based mechanisms. The MIF there comprises 
an element intended to cover expenses that are 
inherent in the processing of any transaction 
carried out, an element intended to cover the cost 
of collective security measures and an element 
intended to cover the expenditure-related to 
the guarantee of payments. The interchange 
fee is calculated on the basis of this formula 
for every pair of banks, taking into account the 
fraud incidents observed between them. In some 
countries, interchange fees are not only aimed at 
recovering costs, but also at generating a proﬁ  t 
margin.
More recently, a “balancing theory” was put 
forward in justiﬁ   cation of interchange fees. 
In order to assess multilateral interchange fees 
under Article 101(3) of the TFEU, the concept 
of the merchant indifference test was introduced 
and applied to set the level of interchange fees, 
in particular for the provision of cross-border 
payment card transactions. On 1 April 2009, the 
European Commission announced the results of 
its discussions with MasterCard. In essence, the 
Commission took note of MasterCard’s decision 
to apply a new methodology that results in a 
lower average weighted MIF level than that 
which had been found to violate EU antitrust 
rules.
Since July 2009, MasterCard has undertaken the 
following three commitments:
The repeal of the increases in its scheme fees  1. 
introduced in October 2008.
Calculation of the cross-border MIF  2. 
according to the “tourist-test” methodology, 
which will lead to a substantially reduced 24
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maximum weighted average MIF level of 
0.30% per transaction in the case of credit 
cards and 0.20% per transaction in that of 
debit cards.
This compares with, depending on the card, 
cross-border MIFs ranging from 0.80% to 
1.90% in the case of MasterCard’s in 2007, 
while Maestro’s cross-border MIFs ranged 
from more than 0.4% to more than 0.75%.
The adoption of some other related measures  3. 
to enhance the transparency of the scheme.
The proposed methodology for calculating the 
MIF level is based on the economic concept of the 
so-called merchant indifference test. According 
to this test, the appropriate MIF level would be 
a level at which a merchant would not refuse a 
card payment by a non-repeat customer even if 
this non-repeat customer had enough cash on 
hand to pay for the purchases. According to this 
avoided-cost test, a balancing fee is set to a level 
that enhances user beneﬁ  ts. In fact, the fee would 
pass this test if the merchant is willing to allow 
the consumer to pay by card. In other words, it 
would make merchants indifferent to accepting 
cash or cards as a payment instrument.
In addition, capping the maximum fee on the basis 
of the merchant’s avoided costs would prevent 
merchants from accepting card payments that 
they do not want. Moreover, if such MIF could 
be passed on, in part, to the cardholder, it would 
ensure that the cardholder’s decisions with regard 
to the choice of payment instrument are based on 
efﬁ  ciency considerations.
The level of the revised MIF has been based 
on the results of central bank studies on the 
cost of payments in the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Sweden. The amount is calculated using 
the difference between the merchant’s costs of 
accepting payments in cash and those of accepting 
card payments.
Similarly to MasterCard, Visa Europe offered on 
26 April 2010 to reduce its maximum weighted 
average MIF for cross border transactions 
within the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
for national transactions with Visa consumer 
debit cards such as Visa, Visa Electron or 
V Pay to 0.20% in a number of Member States 
(Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, 
Sweden, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). 
The commitment was made binding via a 
Commission Decision of December 2010, 
which will apply for four years. The reduction 
of the MIF to 20 basis points for debit card 
transactions is in line with MasterCard’s 
commitment of April 2009. The MIF of 20 basis 
points in place for Visa Europe’s debit card is 
in conformity with that set on the basis of the 
“merchant-indifference” methodology.
MERCHANT SERVICE CHARGES 14
The main component of merchant fees, the 
so-called merchant service charge (MSC), 
is an interchange fee. For several schemes, this 
fee is subject to bilateral negotiations between 
acquiring banks and merchants. Some card 
schemes report that big merchants have a wider 
margin to negotiate the level of the merchant 
fee, especially in case of strong competition on 
the acquiring side of the market. In some cases, 
it is also possible that merchant fees are not 
charged at all. As interchange fees are the main 
component of merchant fees, merchants are very 
interested both in knowing their exact level and 
in transparency on this issue. 
In most countries, interchange fees are not known 
to merchants. Card schemes argue that merchants 
should not have access to this information because 
it is an interbank issue. However, there are few 
exceptions to this policy of non-disclosure, e.g. in 
Italy, Spain and Ireland. In France, the calculation 
formula is publicly available, but not the fee level 
itself, as it varies for every pair of banks. 
One of the terms of the EU Commission’s 
exemption for Visa is that, upon request, 
merchants could be informed of the interchange 
For developments in the MSC, see European Commission,  14 
“Report on the retail banking sector inquiry”, Commission 
Staff Working Document, January 2007, p. 120 (available on 
the Commission’s website at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
sectors/ﬁ  nancial_services/inquiries/sec_2007_106.pdf).25
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fee level and its breakdown into the three cost 
elements mentioned above. Following its 
undertakings of 2009, MasterCard has made all 
interchange fees set by MasterCard available on 
its websites. Visa Europe had started to publish 
the effective intra-regional MIF rates on its 
website in May 2004.
ISSUER, ACQUIRER AND MERCHANT PERSPECTIVES
Card schemes set certain rules and conditions for 
their members. Some of these rules and conditions 
must necessarily be reﬂ  ected in the contracts that 
issuers sign with cardholders and acquirers sign 
with merchants. There are other aspects of the 
contract that are left to each issuer or acquirer 
to deﬁ  ne, e.g. the level of the merchant fee, thus 
leaving room for competition. Merchants have 
often expressed concerns about some of the 
standard clauses deﬁ   ned by the card schemes. 
This section reviews selected rules and conditions. 
These include the “no surcharging” rule, the “no 
acquiring without issuing” rule and the “honour 
all cards” rule (i.e. the rule of accepting all card 
products of a given card scheme).
The “no acquiring without issuing” rule, 
if applicable, prevents members of schemes from 
pursuing only acquiring activity, as members 
are also required to be active in card issuance. 
This rule can contribute to the initial take-off of 
a scheme, since card payments take place on a 
two-sided market, where both issuers and 
acquirers are needed. The “no acquiring without 
issuing” rule therefore ensures a certain balance 
between the issuing and acquiring activities 
within each bank. Visa Europe used to have 
this rule, which had been cleared by the EU 
Commission as not being harmful to competition. 
However, it was abolished in January 2005. 
MasterCard, too, used to have this rule for credit 
cards, but it was likewise abolished in January 
2005. No national scheme has a “no acquiring 
without issuing” rule. In practice, however, 
despite there being no compulsion, most banks 
are issuers and acquirers at the same time. In 
sum, the level of interchange fees cannot be 
related to the existence of this rule, which has 
been discontinued.
The “honour all cards” rule is another rule with 
respect to interchange fees. According to this 
rule, merchants are obliged to accept all the 
brands issued within a single card scheme,15 
irrespective of the level of merchant fee and, 
therefore, the interchange fee. If a merchant 
accepts a given scheme, the merchant also has 
to accept all products of that scheme. The 
merchant may even be forced to accept products 
that are marketed in the future, i.e. without 
knowing the exact charges or fees it will face on 
those products. The honour-all-cards rule has 
the effect of tying the acceptance of expensive 
card products to that of low-cost card products. 
In the case of national schemes, this rule does 
not exist, or is not applicable where there is only 
one payment product.16
SURCHARGING RULES AND PRACTICES
An argument often used in the context of 
interchange fees is that merchants face a higher 
cost for card payments, in particular credit card 
payments, in comparison with other payment 
instruments, although they charge the same 
amount to all clients regardless of the payment 
media. The “no surcharge rule” explicitly 
prohibits such a different pricing for cards 
transactions. It is also argued that the effect of 
a higher interchange fee is that merchants may 
increase the general level of prices. Consequently, 
clients without cards cross-subsidise clients 
with cards.
It must be underlined that the rule applies per scheme;  15 
co-branding with other schemes does not make all co-branded 
schemes eligible. If, for example, a national card scheme applies 
the rule and its cards are co-branded with an international 
card scheme, merchants would not be obliged to accept the 
international brand; they would only be obliged to accept all 
brands issued under the national card scheme.
MasterCard already has a separate honour-all-cards rule for  16 
MasterCard credit cards and Maestro debit cards, i.e. merchants 
may freely choose to accept either. MasterCard has committed 
itself not to make any changes to these rules and to require its 
acquirers to inform merchants that they are permitted to accept 
MasterCard cards and/or Maestro cards and/or competing 
schemes’ cards. Similarly, Visa Europe already has a separate 
honour-all-cards rule for VISA, VISA Electron and VPaycards. 
In its commitments, Visa has undertaken to maintain the honour-
all-cards rule as it applies to consumer debit transactions and to 
inform merchants that they are free to choose to accept VISA 
branded cards and/or VISA Electron branded cards and/or VPay 
branded cards.26
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Surcharging occurs when the merchant charges 
an additional amount to clients paying with a 
card, or gives a discount to clients paying with an 
alternative payment instrument. If surcharging 
were possible and effectively implemented by 
merchants, it would be a tool for the merchant 
to direct their customers towards using of the 
payment instrument the former prefer.
One reason for merchants not to apply pricing 
differentials is that it may entail a cost in itself. 
This is because the merchant has to recalculate 
the price according to the payment media and 
this makes the execution of the transaction 
longer. But this should not be a problem if the 
cashier services are automated, as in the case of 
internet commerce, for instance. Another reason 
for merchants to refrain from surcharging is 
that it is not generalised and that there are ﬁ  rst-
mover disadvantages since it is an unpopular 
measure. It has also to be noted that surcharging 
is a tool to facilitate choice among cards and not 
to discriminate among payment instruments. 
Surcharging entails a risk of moving to cash, 
which also has a cost for merchants.17
Recently, the ESCB has carried out a fact-
ﬁ   nding exercise on the transposition of the 
surcharging option in the Payment Services 
Directive (PSD). According to the PSD, the 
“payment service provider shall not prevent the 
payee from requesting from the payer a charge 
or from offering him a reduction for the use of a 
given payment instrument. However, Member 
States may forbid or limit the right to request 
charges taking into account the need to 
encourage competition and promote the use of 
efﬁ   cient payment instruments.” Overall, 
25 central banks participated in the survey and 
information on the two remaining countries was 
obtained from other sources. 14 countries 18 
reported to have exercised the option of forbidding 
surcharging, while 13 countries 19 have not used 
the option.
The countries that have banned surcharging 
reported that they had done so mainly to avoid 
a distortion between efﬁ   cient card payments 
and inefﬁ  cient cash payments, but also to better 
protect the interest of consumers, prevent added 
complexity for merchants and to ensure a level 
playing ﬁ  eld. The ban on surcharging typically 
applies to all payment cards, except in the case 
of Denmark where surcharging is allowed only 
on cards issued by non-Danish banks. It should 
be noted that the European Commission has 
formally complained about the surcharging rules 
in Denmark, which discriminate citizens from 
other EU countries vis-à-vis Danish citizens. As a 
result, the rules in Denmark will now be changed. 
According to the amended rules, which will take 
effect on 1 October 2011, merchants will be 
allowed to impose a surcharge on all credit cards, 
rather than on only foreign cards, as is the case 
today, while there will be a ban on surcharging 
debit cards, irrespective of their origin.
Countries in which surcharging is allowed 
reported that a prohibition thereof was not 
seen to be necessary as surcharging was very 
limited, but also that it was allowed in order 
not to hinder the development of more efﬁ  cient 
payment instruments, impair competition 
among payment cards, hide the cost of various 
payment cards from the consumer and intervene 
in a business matter involving relations between 
retailers and customers. In most countries, 
surcharging is limited to a few business 
segments/industries, e.g. small shops and the 
airline industry. Face-to-face surcharging is still 
quite rare. In the Netherlands, the tendency to 
impose a surcharge seems relatively to be a little 
higher in the case of credit cards than in that of 
debit cards. In Denmark before 2005, retailers 
were not allowed to surcharge Dankort POS 
transactions, but only when the Dankort card 
was used for online, i.e. internet, transactions. 
See also Bolt et al. (2010) for supporting evidence with respect  17 
to the Dutch market.
Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy,  18 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and 
Slovakia.
Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Malta,  19 
the Netherlands, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.27
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Surcharging was then allowed on Dankort POS 
transactions as from 1 January 2005 when the 
banks were also given the possibility to charge 
merchants for those transactions, which had not 
been allowed before that date. However, already 
with effect from March 2005, the rules were 
changed yet again, to those currently in force. 
According to these rules, the merchants pay a 
regulated  ﬁ   xed fee, which changes stepwise 
according to the number of transactions, while 
merchants are not allowed to charge any card 
fees from consumers at a POS.
Where surcharging takes place, it generally 
applies to both debit and credit card transactions. 
In most countries that allow surcharging, there 
are no legally set limits, but retailers are required 
to inform consumers of the fact that a surcharge 
is being levied and of the level thereof. Most 
countries have not observed any major reactions 
from the cardholder or merchant side, partly due 
to the fact that – although now explicitly allowed 
by law – the surcharge practices in shops have 
simply not been changed. In addition, merchants 
are reluctant to impose a surcharge, and 
consumers do not expect to be surcharged, except 
for certain types of purchases. Also, merchants 
are likely to fear the loss of a sale to a competitor 
in an environment where card acceptance is 
universal, but card surcharging is not common.
Overall, different practices and experiences on 
surcharging exist in Europe. The decision to ban 
or allow surcharging involves a complex trade-
off between considerations in the ﬁ  eld  of 
efﬁ   ciency, consumer protection, transparency 
and competition.20 In countries where surcharging 
is forbidden, the rule typically applies with no 
exceptions, i.e. to all industries/sectors and all 
payment cards. In countries where surcharging is 
allowed, it occurs mainly in a few business 
segments, but for both debit and credit cards and 
without a legally ﬁ   xed limit. No major 
market reactions have been observed; either due 
to the fact that surcharging was rarely used 
before, or because the rules are unchanged and 
surcharging is limited.
For a more theoretical and formal model approach on  20 
surcharging, see also Economides and Henriques (2011).28
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6  ANTITRUST POLICY AND REGULATORY 
PERSPECTIVES
This section provides a brief summary of 
general competition principles, followed by a 
comparison of some selected legal assessments 
and public authorities’ involvement in the ﬁ  eld 
of interchange fees.
6.1 GENERAL  PRINCIPLES
Restrictions of competition regarding 
interchange fees could occur both between 
actors within a scheme, e.g. as intra-system 
competition between acquirers or issuers, 
or between schemes, e.g. as inter-system 
competition between Visa and MasterCard. 
From a legal point of view, the key question is 
whether or not a centrally set interchange fee 
restricts competition either (i) as an agreement 
between undertakings or as decisions taken by 
associations of undertakings, or (ii) as an abuse 
of a dominant position. In this paper, the focus 
is on interchange fees as an agreement between 
undertakings or a decision taken by associations 
of undertakings.
In the EU, not only the European Commission, 
but also national competition authorities such as 
the Latvian Competition Council (CC), the Italian 
Antitrust Authority (AGCM), the Hungarian 
Competition Authority (GVH), the Polish Ofﬁ  ce 
of Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) 
and the Spanish Tribunal for the Defence of 
Competition (TDC) (currently the Comisión 
Nacional de la Competencia (CNC))  21 have 
assessed the competition aspects of interchange 
fees in decisions. The UK Ofﬁ  ce of Fair Trading 
(OFT) also made an assessment, which was set 
aside by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) 
on account of procedural problems. 
Agreements between undertakings or decisions 
by associations of undertakings which have as 
their object, or effect, the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the internal 
market are prohibited and automatically null and 
void. Under certain circumstances, however, the 
aforementioned provisions could be declared 
inapplicable if an agreement contributes to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the beneﬁ  ts 
(Article 101 of the TFEU). Abuse by one or 
more undertakings of a dominant position within 
the common market, or in a substantial part 
thereof, is prohibited as incompatible insofar 
as it may affect trade between Member States 
(Article 102 of the TFEU). Whereas Article 101 
of the TFEU is aimed at various forms of 
cooperation between entities, which hinder 
competition, Article 102 relates to abusive 
conduct by dominant actors that is not primarily 
characterised by any agreement, decision or 
concerted practice between undertakings. 
When analysing any kind of breach of 
competition, the relevant market would have 
to be deﬁ   ned. The relevant market consists 
of the product market and the geographical 
market. The product market for cards could be 
the market for payments, the market for cards, 
the market for card issuing or card acquiring, 
or even the market for debit card or credit card 
acquiring. The geographical market could, for 
instance, be deﬁ  ned as regional, national, EU or 
global.
6.2  ROLE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
Competition authorities, both at the national and 
at the EU level, are often involved in questions 
related to the setting and level of interchange fees, 
and have frequently taken up investigations 
regarding these issues. The involvement of 
national central banks is more the exception 
than the rule.
For example, from 1998 to 2005, the Banca 
d’Italia (as the competition authority and 
overseer) established rules and requirements 
on the level of fees in Italy, and its approval 
was required after every revision. Since 2006, 
such rules are being adopted and updated by 
In 2007, the Spanish Tribunal for the Defence of Competition  21 
(TDC) was restructured and renamed Comisión Nacional de la 
Competencia (CNC) and has been actively involved in the issue 
of MIFs ever since.29
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the general antitrust authority.22 In France, 
the French competition authority deﬁ  ned  the 
formula for calculating the level of fees for card 
payments. Interchange fees for cash withdrawals 
were left unconsidered, being regarded as a 
pure interbank issue without any repercussions 
on merchants. In Germany, the German 
competition authority (the Bundeskartellamt) 
approved the merchant fee level in 1990. 
In Spain, the competition authority objected to 
the calculation methods of the three Spanish 
schemes (ServiRed, Sistema 4B and Euro 6000). 
Since January 2011, Spanish schemes are free 
to decide individually and independently on the 
level of the default interchange fees they apply, 
while still ensuring maximum transparency. 
Any agreement a scheme may reach has to be 
reported to the national competition authority, 
along with a self-assessment that proves its 
compatibility with the provisions of anti-trust 
legislation. In the Netherlands, an interchange 
fee was put in place when central acquiring was 
replaced by individual banks’ acquiring after 
the decision of the Dutch competition authority 
on Interpay in 2004. PIN participants decided 
thereafter to establish bilateral interchange fees. 
6.3  LEGAL ASSESSMENTS AND DECISIONS 
ON INTERCHANGE FEES
The following summarises and compares some 
selected EU regulatory decisions regarding 
MIFs. A summary of individual cases, together 
with a table summarising the decisions, 
is presented in Annex 3. National decisions were 
largely available only as summaries in English. 
The references to Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community 
(EC Treaty) are kept in the text below, due to 
that Treaty having been in force at that time. 
In the current Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), these articles are 
Articles 101 and 102.
RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION
The legal assessments made by the Commission 
(MasterCard, 2007, and Visa International, 
2002), the Latvian CC (Latvian commercial 
banks, 2011), the Italian AGCM (MasterCard 
and eight Italian banks, 2010), the Hungarian 
GVH (Hungarian ﬁ  nancial institutions, Visa and 
MasterCard, 2009) the Polish OCCP (20 Polish 
banks in Visa and MasterCard systems, 2007) 
and the Spanish TDC (ServiRed, Sistema 4B 
and Euro 6000, 2005)  23 were all related to the 
question as to whether the cooperation between 
banks when setting a common interchange fee 
was restricting competition and, if so, whether 
the interchange fee fulﬁ  lled the conditions for 
an exemption under the provisions of 
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. This section 
presents and compares the series of elements 
taken into account in the reasoning behind the 
decisions relating to these legal assessments. 
However, it must be borne in mind that the 
prerequisites for these cases were different in 
parts, which only allows general conclusions to 
be drawn. Some of the decisions related to cross-
border activity, while others were restricted to 
the national level. In some cases, the relevant 
market is the market for payment cards, while in 
other cases it is restricted to card issuing and/or 
acquiring.
RELEVANT MARKET
In the Commission’s Visa decision of 2002, 
two kinds of markets were distinguished, namely 
the inter-system market – competition between 
different payment systems, e.g. different card 
schemes and possibly also other means of 
payment – and the intra-system market – 
competition between ﬁ  nancial institutions with 
respect to card-related activities, e.g. issuing 
cards to individuals and acquiring merchants for 
the acceptance of card payments. The main 
focus of the Commission’s analysis in this 
decision was on the inter-system market, where 
the relevant market was considered to be the 
market for payment cards, as was also the 
view of the TDC (2005). Later decisions by 
European and national competition authorities 
focused mainly on the intra-system market, 
Since 2006, Banca d’Italia is no longer the Competition Authority  22 
for the banking sector, according to L. Decree 262/2005.
The reasoning of the UK Ofﬁ  ce of Fair Trading in its MasterCard  23 
decision is also of some interest, despite it having been set aside 
by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. A summary is therefore 
attached in Annex 2.30
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restricting the relevant market to card acquiring 
or card issuing  24 by arguing that the card 
services provided to merchants and those 
provided to cardholders are two distinct services 
that are provided on the basis of structurally 
different pricing to two groups of customers, 
with card acquiring usually being based on a 
fee paid for each transaction, while cardholders 
typically pay annual fees. In its 2007 MasterCard 
decision, the Commission also pointed out that 
card acquiring services are not sufﬁ  ciently 
replaceable by other payment services such 
as cash, cheques and bank giro or direct debit 
services.
In the Commission’s MasterCard decision 
(2007), the geographical market was deemed to 
be a national market, while in its Visa decision 
(2002), the Commission had found that the 
market for inter-system competition might be 
broader than the national markets.
JUSTIFICATION OF MULTILATERAL 
INTERCHANGE FEES
Visa defended its MIF as a way of balancing 
the conﬂ   icting interests of merchants and 
cardholders by distributing the costs of the 
system between the two user groups in a way 
that corresponds with the marginal beneﬁ  t 
that each user derives from the system, and 
thus maximising the overall use of the system. 
The costs were split into three different categories: 
processing costs, the payment guarantee and 
the free funding period. MasterCard initially 
claimed that their MIF was a way of distributing 
costs between scheme issuers and acquirers, 
but later argued that it was a tool to balance 
cardholder and merchant demand without 
having the function of a “price”. Latvian banks 
claimed that a MIF was necessary in order to 
ensure the availability of a card payment system 
and to promote the use of card payments. 
Polish banks, too, were of the opinion that an 
interchange fee is an indispensable income 
source for issuing banks, allowing them both 
to cover the costs related to their card operations 
and to avoid charging cardholders. According to 
the TDC decisions (2005), the Spanish schemes 
(ServiRed, Sistema 4B and Euro 6000) defended 
their interchange fees as being indispensable 
for the operation of their network, without 
providing any detailed justiﬁ  cation of such fees. 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN UNDERTAKINGS/
DECISIONS BY ASSOCIATIONS OF UNDERTAKINGS
When assessing whether competition is 
being restricted, the ﬁ   rst issue to consider 
is whether the interchange fee is the result 
of an agreement between undertakings, or a 
decision by an associations of undertakings, or 
a concerted practice that restricts competition. 
The MIF in the Visa system were deemed 
by the Commission in 2002 to amount to an 
appreciable restriction of competition by limiting 
the freedom of banks individually to decide 
their own pricing policies, which distorted the 
conditions of competition on the Visa issuing 
and acquiring markets. The Commission found 
that the Visa rules could be regarded either as 
decisions of an association of undertakings or as 
agreements between undertakings. In the case 
of the MasterCard decision (2007), decisions 
on the level and structure of the interchange 
fees and the related network rules adopted by 
MasterCard were found to be decisions of an 
association of undertakings within the meaning 
of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty. According to 
the Commission, they remained decisions of an 
association even after the initial public offering 
(IPO) of MasterCard Incorporated in 2006 and 
the related changes to the governance of the 
payment organisation in Europe with regard to 
the authority for setting the level of MIFs.
The reasoning of the Spanish TDC in 2005 
followed the same line, stating that agreements 
between banks to set an interchange fee are 
equivalent to the concerted practice of ﬁ  xing the 
price that the issuing banks charge the acquiring 
banks. The Hungarian GVH found in 2009 that 
the banks concerned uniformly determined 
the level of interchange fees for both major 
international payment card schemes, which 
Commission’s MasterCard decision of 2007, CC’s decision  24 
(Latvian commercial banks), AGCM decision (MasterCard 
and 8 Italian banks) and OCCP’s decision regarding Visa and 
MasterCard (2007).31
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hindered competition between Visa Europe and 
MasterCard Europe, and competition between 
acquiring banks. The Polish OCCP stated in 
its decision of 2007 that 20 Polish banks had 
jointly set rates for domestic interchange fees, 
in violation of both Polish legislation and 
EC law. MasterCard and eight Italian banks were 
considered by the Italian AGCM in 2010 to have 
established agreements restricting competition 
so as to maintain high interbank fees. In 2011, 
the Latvian CC found that the multilateral 
agreement between banks hampered, restricted 
and distorted competition in the Latvian cards 
market both by object and by effect.
Overall, the setting of a multilateral interchange 
fee seems generally to be considered an 
agreement between competitors, or a decision 
of an association of competitors, that restricts 
competition by ﬁ   xing prices. Bilateral 
agreements on interchange fees between issuers 
and acquirers, which are permissible, albeit not 
frequently used in all Member States, appear not 
to change this assessment.
CONTRIBUTION TO PROMOTING TECHNICAL 
OR ECONOMIC PROGRESS
The next issue to consider when assessing 
whether competition is being restricted is that 
as to whether the agreement at hand fulﬁ  ls the 
prerequisites for an exemption. This is done, 
ﬁ   rst, by assessing whether the interchange 
fee contributes to promoting technical or 
economic progress.
In its Visa decision of 2002, the Commission 
initially pointed out that a MIF is not a price 
charged to a consumer, but a remuneration paid 
between banks who must deal with each other 
for the settlement of a card payment transaction, 
and thus have no choice of partner. The absence 
of some sort of default rule on the terms 
of settlement could lead to abuse by the issuing 
bank, which is in a position of monopsony as 
regards the acquiring bank for the settlement of 
an individual payment transaction. Thus, some 
kind of default arrangement is necessary, 
but whether it qualiﬁ  es for exemption or not will 
depend on the details of the arrangement. 
Moreover, the Commission found that it is in 
theory technically feasible for the Visa scheme 
to function with arrangements other than an 
MIF. The modiﬁ  ed  MIF  25 was, however, 
considered to contribute to technical and 
economic progress in the meaning of 
Article 81(3), namely to the existence of a 
large-scale international payment system with 
positive network externalities. In its 2007 
MasterCard decision, the Commission took a 
different position, initially stating that it was not 
disputed that payment card schemes such as 
MasterCard may represent, as such, economic 
and technical progress. The decisive question 
was, however, whether the MIF speciﬁ  cally 
contributed to such progress, which MasterCard 
was not able to show.26 
The Hungarian GVH did not contest in 2009 
that collective multilateral agreements may 
produce substantial efﬁ  ciencies, but no evidence 
had been provided to show that the restriction 
of competition was limited to the reasonably 
necessary. In its decision on Sistema 4B in 2005, 
the Spanish TDC considered an interchange 
fee as such to be justiﬁ  ed, due to the need for 
a multilateral agreement on compensation for 
the operation of a payment system which is 
useful for the consumer and has beneﬁ  ts for the 
merchant. This was conﬁ  rmed in the ServiRed 
decision, in which the court stated that the 
ﬁ   xing of interchange fees between the card 
issuers is capable of contributing to technical 
and economic progress, provided that it met 
the conditions set out in the Competition Act 
(which ServiRed failed to do). The Polish OCCP 
followed the same line in 2007, concluding 
that banks had not been able to present any 
convincing evidence to support their claim that 
the interchange fee was an instrument for the 
optimal distribution of costs. This was a position 
During the proceedings, Visa decided in June 2001 to reduce its  25 
intra-regional MIF by introducing a ﬁ  xed-rate per-transaction 
MIF for debit cards and a phased reduction of the level of the 
ad valorem per-transaction MIFs applicable to certain types of 
credit and deferred debit cards.
The claim that an MIF creates efﬁ  ciencies must be founded,  26 
according to the Commission, on a detailed, robust and 
compelling analysis that relies, in its assumptions and deductions, 
on empirical data.32
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also supported by the Latvian CC in 2011 when 
it pointed out that the CC had repeatedly asked 
banks to provide evidence that the beneﬁ  ts of 
the multilateral agreement counterbalanced 
restrictions to competition, which banks had 
failed to do.
It was only in the Commission’s Visa decision 
(2002) that the MIF was considered to contribute 
to promoting technical and economic progress. 
In later decisions, competition authorities have 
not accepted the reasoning provided by card 
schemes, an issue which might to some degree 
be related to the relevant market determined. 
If the relevant market is considered to be the 
market for cards, it might be easier to accept an 
MIF as a balancing mechanism, contributing to 
promote efﬁ  ciency and progress for the whole 
scheme, than if the market is restricted only to 
the market for card issuing or acquiring. It seems 
also to be a matter of proof – in all cases where 
the competition authorities have not accepted 
that the MIF contributes to promoting technical 
or economic progress, they have stated that it 
was due to the lack of convincing analysis and 
evidence.
COST CATEGORIES
Visa International claimed in 2002 that for the 
assessment of their MIF, costs based on three 
cost categories, namely (i) the processing costs, 
(ii) the payment guarantee and (iii) a free funding 
period, constituted an objective benchmark for 
supplying Visa payment services. These cost 
categories were also used by the Spanish card 
schemes, and by Polish banks together with Visa 
and MasterCard, to prove that the agreements on 
MIFs meet the conditions for exemptions set out 
in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.
Issuing banks’ costs for processing card 
payments, apart from account maintenance, were 
considered by the Commission in its 2002 Visa 
decision as being to the beneﬁ  t of the merchant, 
especially in the context of international 
card transactions. According to the TDC, the 
authorisation and processing costs for credit 
and debit cards should be expressed as a ﬁ  xed 
amount per transaction. The OCCP found that 
payment processing costs varied signiﬁ  cantly 
between card schemes, banks and even within 
banks. The OCCP therefore pointed out that not 
every cost that can be linked with an operation 
of a payment card should be included in the 
interchange fee, and should thus be borne by 
merchants. There had to exist a convincing 
direct relationship between a given activity and 
the beneﬁ  ts that merchants receive from it. 
The payment guarantee 27 was considered by the 
Commission in its 2002 decision to be an 
insurance against fraud and cardholder default 
for merchants. The Commission expressed some 
concern that, if not provided by the issuing bank, 
such a service might not be widely available for 
merchants at reasonable cost. There was also a 
risk, from the Commission’s point of view, that, 
without a payment guarantee, some retailers 
might consider not to accept Visa cards, which 
would then be less attractive to cardholders and 
thereby start a downward spiral in the size and 
level of usage of the Visa system. The TDC 
emphasised that ﬁ  nancing the free funding period 
and the payment guarantee created greater costs 
in credit card transactions than in debit card 
transactions. In its decision on Sistema 4B of 
2005, the TDC found that, in the majority of 
cases, a default was temporary and not deﬁ  nitive, 
and that it was only in the event of deﬁ  nitive 
payment default that the issuing bank faced real 
costs. Given that banks obtain a considerable 
proﬁ  t from charging clients for delayed payments, 
the TDC considered it to be quite reasonable to 
assume that this proﬁ  t amply compensated for 
any costs resulting from a deﬁ  nitive default. On 
the one hand, fraud management was to the 
beneﬁ   t of merchants, but such services could 
also, according to the TDC, be offered directly to 
the merchants by third parties. The OCCP found 
that the costs of the payment guarantee were 
being paid twice: ﬁ  rst, by cardholders to their 
bank in the case of a lack of funds and, second, 
by merchants as part of the MIF. In addition, 
considering the beneﬁ  ts arising from MIFs, banks 
The payment is guaranteed for the merchant, i.e. he/she will  27 
be reimbursed even if the cardholder does not pay for the 
transaction.33
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might not pay sufﬁ  cient attention to the “quality” 
of their customers, which could contribute to 
increasing MIFs further.
The free funding period  28 was considered by the 
Commission in its 2002 decision to facilitate 
and encourage cross-border spending as the 
cardholder did not have to fear taking his 
account into red. The free funding period could 
therefore be justiﬁ  ed, primarily as it beneﬁ  ted 
merchants with whom such purchases were 
made, but also for contributing to promoting 
cross-border purchases. In its Sistema 4B 
decision of 2005, the TDC stated that the 
funding of the interest-free period was a service 
provided by the issuing bank to the credit card 
user. The TDC emphasised that there was no 
evidence, neither theoretical nor empirical, that 
served to prove that this service led to 
a permanent increase in sales of the merchant 
outlets, taken as a whole. The TDC also pointed 
out that the interest-free period, like the default 
management, was closely linked to one of the 
most important sources of income for issuing 
banks, namely the high interest rates charged for 
using credit cards outside the interest-free credit 
periods, and should therefore not be included in 
the interchange fee. The OCCP took a similar 
position, stating that ﬁ  nancing  deferred 
payments was not one of the payment system 
services provided to retailers. It was a service 
provided by card issuers directly to individual 
holders of cards that allow for late payment.
BALANCING MECHANISM
Initially, MasterCard argued that its interchange 
fee was a mechanism for balancing cardholder 
and merchant demand by distributing the 
costs of delivering the service between the 
scheme’s issuers and acquirers. At a later stage, 
MasterCard focused its justiﬁ  cation on the MIF 
being a mechanism to balance demands of 
cardholders and merchants, which did not have 
the function of a “price”. MasterCard advocated 
that the technical and economic progress of 
the MasterCard system was a result of its 
default MIF, since it rendered the system more 
efﬁ  cient.
According to MasterCard, an interchange fee 
was indispensable since issuers and acquirers 
provided a joint service to cardholders and 
merchants, and faced joint demand. The 
common costs for that service should then be 
distributed between those two user groups, 
making the interchange fee indispensable for 
the system’s operation. Furthermore, payment 
system operators could maximise the overall 
value of the product on both sides, since neither 
issuers nor acquirers took into account the effect 
of the prices they set on the other party. The 
Commission did not agree with this reasoning 
in its 2007 decision, claiming that MasterCard’s 
payment system could not be considered to be 
a “joint production” venture, since the costs for 
issuing and acquiring could easily be separated. 
With respect to maximising the scheme’s 
output, the Commission found that MasterCard 
had failed to prove its line of reasoning, since 
no detailed, robust and compelling analysis 
and no empirical evidence had been provided. 
In addition, the Commission stated that an 
increase in the system’s output only contributed 
to appreciable objective advantages if parties 
other than the organisation’s member banks 
beneﬁ  ted therefrom.
ALLOWING CONSUMERS A FAIR SHARE
According to the second condition for exemptions 
under the provisions of Article 81(3) of the EC 
Treaty, consumers must receive a fair share 
of the efﬁ  ciencies generated by the restrictive 
decision/agreement. The concept of consumers 
has been further developed in the Commission’s 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) 
of the EC Treaty,29 where it is stated that the 
concept of consumers should encompass all 
direct or indirect users of the product covered 
by the agreement, including producers that use 
the products as an input, wholesalers, retailers 
and ﬁ  nal consumers. In other words, consumers 
The card-holder does not have to pay his/her purchases  28 
immediately, but only after a certain time that is agreed with the 
issuer – this applies to deferred debit and credit cards.
European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of  29 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty (2004/C 101/08)”, Communication 
from the Commission, Notice, 2004.34
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within the meaning of Article 81(3) are the 
customers of the parties to the agreement and 
their subsequent purchasers. The Commission’s 
interpretation of a consumer in this context is 
considerably wider than what is commonly 
understood as a consumer, namely a natural 
person acting for purposes that are outside 
his/her trade, business or profession. Even if not 
formally binding, the Commission’s guidelines 
in this context provide a strong message on 
interpretation.
In its 2002 Visa decision, the three cost 
categories mentioned earlier were examined and 
the Commission concluded that the modiﬁ  ed 
MIF provided a fair share of the beneﬁ  ts to each 
category of user of the Visa system (cardholders 
and merchants). Where MasterCard was 
concerned, the Commission focused mainly 
on the merchant’s beneﬁ   ts. The Commission 
did not dispute that merchants may beneﬁ  t 
through enhanced network effects of the issuing 
side, but this did not necessarily offset their 
losses from paying inﬂ  ated merchant fees. The 
efﬁ   ciencies of the scheme had to beneﬁ  t  all 
customers, including those that bear the cost of 
its MIF (merchants and subsequent purchasers). 
The Polish OCCP argued along the same line 
in its 2007 decision, stating that the jointly set 
interchange fee imposed costs on merchants for 
services provided by banks to its cardholders, 
so that merchants did not get a fair share of the 
beneﬁ  ts (since the fee includes costs that do not 
beneﬁ  t merchants). 
The Italian AGCM found in 2010 that MasterCard 
and the eight banks had promoted the scheme’s 
expansion by passing the interchange fee on 
to merchants and, consequently, to the prices 
effectively charged of consumers. The Hungarian 
GVH did not ﬁ  nd any evidence to prove that a 
due share of the beneﬁ  ts had reached cardholders 
and merchants in its 2009 decision. The Spanish 
TDC did not go into any detail in 2005, stating 
only that the system should be useful to ﬁ  nal 
consumers and should beneﬁ  t merchants. 
To what extent consumers are provided with 
a fair share of the beneﬁ  ts of cards appears to 
be difﬁ  cult to determine. The tourist test (also 
called the merchant indifference methodology), 
as introduced by Rochet and Tirole in 2006 
(described in more detail in Section 4), has 
been taken on board by the Commission in what 
appears to be an attempt to ﬁ  nd a reasonable 
benchmark for beneﬁ  ts generated for merchants 
and consumers. The intention of the tourist test 
is to ensure that card fees are set at such a level 
that merchants are indifferent to whether they 
receive a payment by card or in cash, with the 
interchange fee corresponding to the value of 
the beneﬁ  t that the card use generates for them. 
The Commission is advocating that a MIF set 
along the lines of the tourist test encourages the 
promotion of efﬁ   cient payment instruments, 
while simultaneously preventing abuses to the 
detriment of the scheme’s users (merchants and 
cardholders).
One of the most important beneﬁ  ts  when 
applying the tourist test for balancing retailer’s 
costs for different means of payments would 
be that consumers as cash payers are released 
from the burden of paying for cardholders’ 
transactions. High card fees passed on by 
merchants to all their customers would not 
provide the community of consumers with any 
beneﬁ  ts in general; on the contrary, consumers 
paying with cash would also have to pay for 
cardholders’ payments and reward programmes. 
From a merchant’s point of view; card fees 
capped at a level similar to the costs incurred 
for cash payments would make the acceptance 
of cards more appealing. A capped MIF might 
therefore contribute to a more widespread 
acceptance of cards among merchants, to the 
beneﬁ  t of all cardholders. From a cardholder’s 
point of view, a restriction of MIFs as a result 
of the application of the tourist test might lead 
to some reduction of card beneﬁ  ts, e.g. reward 
programmes. Any such disadvantages may, 
however, be outweighed by a more widespread 
card acceptance.
INDISPENSABILITY
The issue of indispensability relates to whether 
the applied MIF is proportional to the restriction 35
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of competition in the sense that no less restrictive 
arrangement is possible. The Commission stated 
in its Visa decision 2002 that no alternative, less 
restrictive than the revised Visa MIF, existed at 
the time, which would achieve the advantages 
and beneﬁ   ts to consumers, while being 
practically feasible in the context of the Visa 
International four-party card payment scheme. 
In its 2007 MasterCard decision, the Commission 
found that MasterCard had not proven that its 
MIF was indispensable to maximise system 
output and to achieve any related objective 
efﬁ   ciencies. In addition, the Commission 
pointed out that several payment card schemes 
in the European Economic Area (EEA) had 
been operating successfully without a MIF for a 
long time. Since the agreement on the setting of 
domestic interchange fees did not meet the ﬁ  rst 
and second conditions for an exemption under 
the provisions of in Article 81(3) of the EC 
Treaty (contributing to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers 
a fair share of the resulting beneﬁ  t), the Polish 
OCCP did not analyse whether the agreements 
in question met the other conditions for 
exemption in 2007.
It is only in the Commission’s Visa decision 
that the MIF is considered to be indispensable. 
The change of position in the Commission’s 
MasterCard decision may have originated from 
MasterCard’s reasoning that its MIF was a 
balancing mechanism, instead of a recovery of 
costs for services provided (as Visa had argued). 
It could also be related to the change of focus 
from the inter-system market (the market for 
cards in the Commission’s Visa decision of 
2002) to the intra-system market (the market for 
card acquiring in the Commission’s MasterCard 
decision of 2007). The comparison with national 
payment schemes without a MIF may have been 
due to card acquiring being a service mainly 
provided on a national basis, or it may be an 
indication that the Commission considered the 
European payment market to be more integrated, 
putting cross-border card systems on the same 
cost level as national card systems. Agreeing 
on bilateral fees or processing activities might, 
however, still be more complicated on a cross-
border level than in a national context, which 
was also mentioned in the Commission’s Visa 
decision, where the Commission stated that it 
would not be possible, in the absence of a direct 
contractual relationship between issuers and 
merchants, for issuers to recover their costs of 
services from merchants without some kind of 
multilateral interchange fee arrangement. 
NON-ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION
The fourth and last criterion for exemption under 
Article 81(3) states the agreement should not 
eliminate competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products concerned. In its 2002 Visa 
decision, the Commission stated that the MIF 
did not eliminate competition between issuers 
who remained free to set their respective client 
fees, nor did it eliminate competition between 
acquirers, since acquiring banks were free to 
compete on the other components of the merchant 
fee, apart from the MIF. Nor was the MIF 
considered to eliminate competition between 
Visa and its competitors, since the Commission 
had not found any evidence of concertation 
between Visa and Europay (now MasterCard). 
The Commission did not enter into any 
assessment regarding the non-elimination of 
competition in its decisions on MasterCard 
in 2007. Neither did the national competition 
authorities, probably because they were already 
of the opinion that none of the schemes had 
been able to prove their MIFs’ compliance with 
the other criteria. 
CONCLUSION, LEGAL ASSESSMENTS
The relevant market seems to have been narrowed 
down in recent decisions, from focusing on the 
market for cards in the Commission’s Visa 
decision of 2002 (inter-system market) to the 
market for card acquiring or card issuing in 
more recent decisions (intra-system market).
There seems to be a general consensus among 
competition authorities that interchange fees for 
cards should be seen as an agreement between 
undertakings, or a decision of an association 
of undertakings, which restricts competition 
(Article 81(1)). Different lines of justiﬁ  cation 36
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for an MIF are taken by card schemes, with 
Visa justifying its MIF on grounds of cost and 
MasterCard justifying it as a mechanism for 
balancing demands. Visa’s success with its 
argumentation, however, did not necessarily 
depend on the line of argumentation, but could 
also be related to the relevant market at the time, 
namely the market for cards in Visa’s case and 
the market for card acquiring in the case of 
MasterCard.
In its Visa decision, the Commission accepted 
that a multilaterally agreed interchange fee is 
likely to lead to efﬁ  ciency gains, due to lower 
negotiation and transaction costs, especially in a 
cross-border context. In its MasterCard decision 
of 2007, the Commission did not enter into any 
discussion of the beneﬁ  ts of an MIF in a cross-
border context, referring only to the fact that 
several national card schemes were operating 
without an MIF. This may have been due to 
the relevant market being deﬁ  ned as the market 
for card acquiring, and to the fact that cross-
border card acquiring was only given to a very 
limited extent.
Even if interchange fees for cards are generally 
considered by competition authorities to be an 
agreement restricting competition, it is not 
denied that such agreements could bring 
beneﬁ   ts, which might make them compatible 
with competition law. In most cases, however, 
card schemes have not been able to prove these 
beneﬁ  ts. Until the introduction of the merchant 
indifference test (tourist test), competition 
authorities have provided very limited guidance, 
mainly by stating that card schemes have not 
provided any convincing analysis and evidence 
in justiﬁ  cation of the existence of their MIF. The 
Commission’s introduction of the merchant 
indifference methodology may, however, 
provide some additional guidance on this issue. 
The pending decision of the European General 
Court  30 in the MasterCard case will, of course, 
also bring further clarity on the application of 
interchange fees.
Until 30 November 2009, the European Court of First Instance. 30 37
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The SEPA project represents a major step 
forward along the road towards closer European 
integration and the creation of a well-functioning 
and competitive European retail payments 
market. SEPA will become reality once there 
are no differences in the euro area between 
national and cross-border retail payments. 
Substantial efforts were undertaken by the 
European banking community, the legislator and 
the central banking community to successfully 
launch SEPA credit transfers in 2008 and SEPA 
direct debits in 2009. However, the third missing 
piece in the SEPA puzzle is SEPA for cards.
Payment cards have become a very popular 
way for people to pay for services and goods. 
Cards have proven to be a simple, safe and 
cost-efﬁ  cient payment instrument. Over recent 
years, usage of payment cards has grown at 
an unprecedented rate and has become the 
non-cash payment instrument most used in 
Europe. Intrinsically tied to card payments are 
multilateral interchange fees for card payments. 
The ECB, like many other central banks, has 
studied the issue of interchange fees, given its 
responsibilities for the smooth functioning of 
payment systems. In its catalyst role, the ECB 
closely monitors and assesses developments 
in the ﬁ  eld of SEPA for cards. In this context 
in particular, the ECB provides guidance and 
expresses expectations that further clarity in 
the framework for interchange fees for card 
payments is needed so as to foster the creation 
of an open market environment for card schemes 
and to take the euro area towards an advanced 
retail payment market.
At present, there is only limited knowledge of, 
and evidence on, market practices with regard 
to interchange fees for card payments. With this 
study, the ECB attempts to enhance the general 
understanding of the nature of interchange fees 
and their role for the successful functioning for 
retail payment systems. This study presents a 
comprehensive fact-ﬁ  nding exercise with respect 
to the functioning and the underlying concept of 
interchange fees from an economic and a legal 
perspective. It reviews most recent experiences, 
practices and interpretations of interchange fees 
in European countries. Moreover, it presents 
additional insights into the role and initiatives of 
public authorities in this domain.
From the present study, it can be concluded 
that under certain assumptions, the existence 
of interchange fees in four-party card schemes 
can be explained from an economic point of 
view. Network externalities have the potential 
to substantially limit the contestability of the 
card scheme market. A card brand that is widely 
held could easily set fees and other conditions 
for participation without jeopardising its market 
share.
In recent decisions of competition authorities, 
multilateral interchange fees for cards have 
generally been considered to be decisions of 
associations of undertakings, or as agreements 
between undertakings, which restrict 
competition. It is, however, not denied by 
competition authorities that such agreements 
could bring beneﬁ  ts, which might make them 
compatible with competition law, but in 
most competition cases, card schemes and/
or  ﬁ   nancial institutions have not been able 
to prove these beneﬁ   ts. In the absence of 
convincing analysis and evidence justifying 
the existence and the applied level of MIFs set 
by card schemes, competition authorities have 
only been able to provide limited guidance 
in recent decisions. The Commission’s 
introduction of the merchant indifference 
methodology might, however, bring some 
additional guidance with respect to this issue. 
Further guidance is also expected to be given 
in the pending decision by the European 
General Court in the MasterCard case.
The Eurosystem recognises that clarity on the 
applicability, methodology and the level of MIFs 
is crucial for banks and other payment service 
providers to decide on investments in a European 
card scheme. At the same time, banks should 
not neglect the opportunities that a “SEPA for 
cards” offers. The scope for growth available 
for cards at the point of sale is still substantial 38
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in Europe, especially in some countries. 
The great upward potential for card transactions 
is a business case in itself, even for a scheme that 
operates with a low MIF. Making use of these 
opportunities will require that banks reposition 
their card services and fees, especially towards 
the merchants, and promote the use of cards as 
the secure, easy and cost-efﬁ  cient instrument for 
day-to-day payments in SEPA.
In addition, further empirical evidence on 
multilateral interchange fee issues is required to 
facilitate strategic decision-making by market 
actors regarding the development of new card 
schemes and new payment instruments.
Overall and as stated in the 7th SEPA Progress 
Report (European Central Bank (2010)), the 
Eurosystem’s public stance on interchange 
fees is neutral. This is an issue within the ﬁ  eld 
of competence of the European Commission. 
However, the Eurosystem shares the view that it is 
critical for the success of the Single Euro Payment 
Area that cards can be issued, acquired and used 
throughout the euro area to make euro payments 
without any geographical differentiation. 
Transparency and clarity with respect to the 
real costs and beneﬁ   ts of different payment 
instruments are indispensable for a modern and 
harmonised European retail payments market. 
Interchange fees (if any) should be set at a 
reasonable level and should not prevent the use 
of efﬁ  cient payment instruments. 
A sharp increase in cardholder costs could induce 
consumers to use less efﬁ  cient means of payment, 
thereby hampering the success of, and objectives 
pursued by, the SEPA project. Therefore, 
interchange fees (if any) should be set to promote 
overall economic efﬁ   ciency in compliance 
with competition rules. The Eurosystem 
recommends that a close dialogue take place 
between emerging new card schemes and the 
European Commission on the compatibility with 
competition law of the MIFs they plan to charge. 
Guidance in the form of a regulation might even 
be considered as the ultima ratio (see European 
Central Bank (2010)).39
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Country Payment card scheme Scope Type of transaction Interchange fee
Debit Credit
AT MasterCard International General trade From € 0.053 + 
0.22% to € 0.053 + 
0.3%
1%
Visa International General trade/
supermarket/petrol
1% 1%
BE Bancontact/MisterCash Domestic General trade € 0.056 na
BG Domestic General trade na na
CY MasterCard International General trade 1.75% 1.75%















MasterCard International Government Min € 0.46, max 
€ 46.00
Min € 0.46, max 
€ 46.00
Visa International Government Min € 0.45, max 
€ 45.00
Min € 0.45, max 
€ 45.00
MasterCard International Utilities Min € 0.25, max 
€ 62.96
Min € 0.25, max 
€ 62.96
Visa International Utilities Min € 0.24, max 
€ 61.20
Min € 0.24, max 
€ 61.20
CZ na na na na na
DE Electronic-cash debit 
card scheme
Domestic General trade 0.30% na
Electronic-cash debit 
card scheme
Domestic Petrol 0.2% < € 51.13 
and 0.3% > € 51.13
na
DK The Dankort Domestic Online € 0.12 na
The Dankort Domestic Point of sale na na
International General trade na 0.75%
EE MasterCard, Visa, 
Amex
International General trade na na
ES ServiRed; Sistema 4B; 
Euro 6000
Domestic General trade 0.57%-0.74% 0.57%-0.74%
FI International card 
schemes
International General trade 0.31%-1.15% 0.9%-1.125%
FR Cartes Bancaires Domestic General trade € 0.1067 + 
(0.21% + 0.xx%)
na
GR MasterCard International General trade na na
Visa International General trade € 0.05 - € 0.30 na
Visa International General trade na 0.5%-1.5%
American Express International General trade na na
Diners International General trade na na
ANNEXES 
1  OVERVIEW OF INTERCHANGE FEE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEBIT AND CREDIT CARD PAYMENTS 
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ECB
Occasional Paper No 131
September 2011
Country Payment card scheme Scope Type of transaction Interchange fee
Debit Credit
HU MasterCard International General trade na na
Visa International General trade €0.26 - €0.30 na
Visa International General trade na 0.55%-0.95%
Amex International General trade na na
IE Laser Domestic General trade €0.0381 na
MasterCard; Visa; 
Amex
International General trade na na
IT Bancomat/
PagoBancomat
Domestic General trade €0.12 + 0.1579% na
MasterCard, Visa International General trade na na






Visa International General trade 0.15% + €0.015 to 
0.19% + €0.015
0.5%-0.75%
MasterCard  Domestic General trade Bilateral agreement 
or 0.4% + €0.05 
to 1.05% + €0.05 
(MasterCard)
Bilateral agreement 
MasterCard International General trade 0.1% + €0.05 to 
0.13% + €0.05
0.14% + €0.05 
to 0.18% + €0.05
LU Debit card scheme Domestic General trade None na
International card 
schemes
International General trade na na








International General trade na na
MT Quickcash Domestic General trade na na
Cashlink Domestic General trade na na
APS Premier Domestic General trade na na
International card 
schemes
International General trade na na
NL PIN, MasterCard, Visa Domestic General trade Bilateral agreement, 





MasterCard, Visa International General trade EEA default fee EEA default fee
JCB, Amex, Diners International General trade - Bilateral agreements
PL MasterCard International General trade 1.60% 1.45%
Visa International General trade 1.45% + €0.05 1.50%






Multibanco Domestic Low value payments 0.50% na
MasterCard; Visa; 
Amex
International General trade na na
RO MasterCard; Visa; 
Amex
International General trade, online 1% na
MasterCard; Visa; 
Amex





International Petrol 0.70% na41
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Country Payment card scheme Scope Type of transaction Interchange fee
Debit Credit
SE International General trade Fixed Fee Fixed + Ad Valorem
MasterCard; Visa Domestic General trade Fixed Fee Fixed + Ad Valorem
American Express Domestic General trade na
SI Activa; BA; Karanta; 
Visa
Domestic General trade 0.60%-1.30%
Activa; BA; Karanta; 
Visa
Domestic Petrol 0.00%-0.80%
SK International card 
schemes
International General trade na na
UK MasterCard, Visa, 
Solo, Amex, Diners
Domestic General trade €0.107 0.90%
Source: European System of Central Banks (2010).
Notes: “na” stands for “not applicable”. Figures from Spain represent yearly weighted average MIF values. These have been obtained as 
a result of internal calculations aimed at integrating, into a single metric, fees that were originally separated by card type and that were 
not always recorded as ad valorem fees. Therefore, these average values apply to both credit and debit cards, and are only presented for 
illustrative purposes here.42
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2  REVIEW OF SELECTED LEGAL ASSESSMENTS 
OF INTERCHANGE FEES
2.1  DECISIONS AT THE EU LEVEL
2.1.1 MASTERCARD – EU COMMISSION
Commission decision of 19 December 2007 
(Case No Comp/34.579 MasterCard, 
Comp/36.518 EuroCommerce and Comp/38.580 
Commercial Cards)  30
The Commission decided in December 2007 
that MasterCard had breached Article 81 of the 
Treaty and Article 553 of the EEA Agreement 
by, in effect, setting a minimum price (the intra 
EEA fallback interchange fee), which merchants 
must pay to their acquiring bank for accepting 
payment cards in the EEA.
RELEVANT MARKET
The relevant product market was considered to 
be the market for acquiring payment cards.31 
MasterCard was not, from the Commission’s 
point of view, a product offered jointly to 
cardholders and merchants, but rather a vehicle 
for issuers and acquirers to offer distinct 
services to two groups of customers, including 
two different ways of pricing, a transaction fee 
(merchants) and an annual fee (card-holders). 
The geographical market was considered to be 
national at present.
CONCLUSION
The Commission found that MasterCard 
could still be considered to be operating as an 
association of undertakings, despite its listing 
on the New York Stock Exchange in May 2006, 
since these changes did not affect the principle 
that the multilaterally set fallback interchange 
fee will apply as a fall-back to card transactions 
in the absence of bilateral agreements. The 
commercial interests of the scheme owner and 
the commercial interests of the organisation’s 
(MasterCard) member banks were, according 
to the Commission, related as far as an MIF is 
concerned.32 
From the Commission’s point of view, both 
issuers and acquirers may beneﬁ  t commercially 
from an MIF, directly or indirectly.33 
MasterCard’s argument that there was no less 
restrictive alternative to the MIF, since bilateral 
negotiations between all banks would be 
impossible taking the high number of banks 
involved into consideration, was not taken on by 
the Commission, which claimed that there were 
successful card schemes operating without a 
MIF in the EEA and that the MIF restricted 
competition between acquiring banks by 
inﬂ  ating the base on which acquiring banks set 
charges to merchants and, thereby, deﬁ  ne a ﬂ  oor 
for the merchant fee. The Commission therefore 
found that an MIF was not objectively necessary 
for the cooperation of banks in the MasterCard 
system and the viability of the scheme.
MasterCard’s position that the MIF was not a 
fee for services or a price for speciﬁ  c services, 
but a balancing mechanism for cardholder and 
merchant demands was not taken into account by 
the Commission. First, they could not consider 
MasterCard’s system as a joint payment system, 
since the costs for issuing and acquiring could 
be separated and, second, MasterCard was not 
able to demonstrate the link between the MIF 
and its objective efﬁ  ciencies. 
The Commission agreed that merchants might 
beneﬁ   t from enhanced network effects, but 
this did not necessarily offset the losses that 
result from paying inﬂ  ated merchant fees, since 
Available at:  30 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_
details.cfm?proc_code=1_34579
MasterCard claimed that the relevant product market should  31 
be the market where different payment card system’s services 
compete with each other and with all other forms of payment, 
including cash and cheques.
By maximising member banks’ proceeds from interchange  32 
fees, a scheme owner can also increase its own revenues and, 
ultimately, dividends to its shareholders (be they banks and/or 
public investors).
An MIF allows a payment organisation to raise the marginal cost  33 
of all acquirers in a collective manner that enables the acquirers 
to set a higher price for merchants. The additional revenues 
are then transferred to the card-issuing bank. For banks with 
an issuing business, the MIF thereby creates a direct source of 
revenues. For acquirers without any issuing business, the MIF 
also generates revenues, albeit indirectly. Acquirers expect that 
some issuers “invest” a portion of their revenues from the MIF in 
promoting further card usage, which may, in turn, lead to some 
increase of transaction volumes at merchant outlets. Hence, both 
issuers and acquirers may beneﬁ  t commercially from an MIF, 
be it directly or indirectly.43
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the MIF included cost elements that are not 
related to services which sufﬁ  ciently  beneﬁ  t 
merchants, e.g. the free funding period and 
issuing banks’ costs for setting up and managing 
bank accounts. The objective efﬁ  ciencies  of 
an MIF should beneﬁ  t all customers, including 
those that bear the costs of the MIF, merchants 
and purchasers, which MasterCard had not been 
able to demonstrate. 
From the Commission’s point of view, 
MasterCard had not offered any factual 
or empirical evidence that the MIF was 
indispensable so as to maximise system output 
and achieve the claimed efﬁ  ciencies. 
ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER THE COMMISSION’S 
DECISION
March 2008: MasterCard appealed the decision 
to the European Court of First Instance.34 
June 2008: MasterCard provisionally repealed 
its cross-border MIF, which was the subject of 
the Commission’s decision. 
October 2008: MasterCard revised its acquirer 
pricing structure in the EEA, which included 
increasing certain existing acquirer fees, 
introducing a new fee on acquirers and repealing 
certain acquirer fee waivers.
MasterCard decided on 1 April 2009 to cut 
cross-border MIFs and to repeal recent scheme 
fee increases, awaiting the outcome of its 
appeal to the European Court of First Instance. 
The maximum weighted average MIF per 
transaction was reduced to 0.30% for consumer 
credit cards and to 0.20% for consumer debit 
cards. In addition, MasterCard agreed to change 
its system rules in order to increase transparency 
and competition in the payments cards 
market. The decision was reached in mutual 
understanding with the Commission. 
The Commission stated in its Q&A paper 
supporting MasterCard’s decision that an 
appropriately set interchange fee could help 
to optimise the utility of a card network to 
merchants and ﬁ  nal consumers. In order for a 
MIF to fulﬁ  l the conditions of Article 81(3) of 
the EC Treaty,35 the methodology to establish 
the MIF needed to provide for adequate 
safeguards to balance the negative effects of the 
MIF. The benchmark applied by MasterCard 
in its revised methodology aimed at providing 
such a safeguard. It capped the MIF at a level 
that a merchant would be willing to pay if he 
were to compare the cost of the customer’s 
use of a payment card with those of non-card 
(cash) payments. The measures announced by 
MasterCard were therefore considered by the 
Commission to be sufﬁ   cient in order not to 
pursue MasterCard for non-compliance with the 
December 2007 decision or for contravening the 
antitrust rules.
2.1.2 VISA INTERNATIONAL – EU COMMISSION
Commission decision of 24 July 2002 (Case No 
COMP/29.373)36
The Commission decided in July 2002 that 
the modiﬁ   ed Visa multilateral interchange 
fee arrangements fulﬁ   lled the conditions for 
exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty 
and thus granted an individual exemption that 
remained into force until 31 December 2007.
The decision related to Visa’s cross-border 
interchange fee scheme for consumer cards 
within the EEA Member States. Its origin was 
a complaint by EuroCommerce who considered 
interchange fees as a mechanism to shift onto 
merchants the costs of a free advantage offered 
to cardholders. The setting of the MIF amounts 
could also, according to EuroCommerce, be 
considered as a price-ﬁ  xing cartel since the level 
of the fee was said to be agreed on between the 
banks without any pressure from the market. Visa 
stated that bilateral agreements between banks on 
From 1 December 2009 the European General Court. 34 
Where a MIF is restrictive under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty  35 
(agreement between undertakings), the parties must demonstrate 
that, despite the restrictive effects, the conditions of Article 81(3) 
are met: 1) empirical proof that the MIF creates efﬁ  ciencies that 
outweigh the restriction of competition; 2) consumers get a fair 
share of those beneﬁ  ts; 3) there are no less restrictive means of 
achieving the efﬁ  ciencies; and 4) competition is not eliminated 
altogether.`
Available at:  36 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_
details.cfm?proc_code=1_2937344
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interchange arrangements were permitted and it 
was only in the absence of such an agreement that 
the MIF was applied.37 The MIF was necessary, 
according to Visa, as a ﬁ  nancial adjustment to 
the imbalance between the costs associated with 
issuing and acquiring and the revenues received 
from cardholders and merchants. Before the 
Commission came to a decision, Visa modiﬁ  ed 
its MIF scheme by (i) lowering the level of the 
MIF, (ii) initiating a cost study to be carried out 
of the three cost categories of the MIF and (iii) 
allowed member banks to reveal information 
about the MIF levels.
RELEVANT MARKET 
Two types of markets could be distinguished 
according to the Commission: the system/
network market (inter-system) or upstream 
market – competition between different payment 
systems, e.g. different card schemes, and 
possibly also other means of payment – and the 
intra-system markets or downstream markets – 
competition between ﬁ   nancial institutions for 
card-related activities, e.g. issuing of cards to 
individuals and acquiring merchants for card 
payment acceptance. The relevant inter-system 
market was considered by the Commission to 
comprise all types of payment cards.38 Regarding 
the intra-system market, the Commission found 
that Visa cards could be considered a distinct 
product for card issuing and card acquiring. 
The main focus of the Commission’s analysis, 
however, was on the inter-system market. 
The relevant geographical market relating to 
payment cards was considered as still mainly 
national, although the market for inter-system 
competition might be wider than the national 
markets. However, since Visa held an important 
market position, even on a worldwide market, 
the precise geographical market deﬁ  nition could 
in this case be left open.39
The Commission did not take any position on 
the Visa market position; it was only mentioned 
that there was a great variety on the national 
markets in the number of cards, and in the 
volume and value of transactions across Member 
States. Moreover, the Commission stated that 
the market power of Visa should not only be 
measured in terms of market shares; Visa had 
important network economies as almost all 
banks issued Visa cards and as Visa cards were 
accepted in some four million merchant outlets 
throughout the EU.
CONCLUSIONS 
The Commission’s conclusion was that the MIF 
in the Visa system amounted to an appreciable 
restriction of competition within the meaning of 
Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53(1) 
of the EEA Agreement. However, the amended 
MIF contributed to technical and economic 
progress, while providing a fair share of these 
beneﬁ  ts to each of the two categories of user of 
the Visa system, and no other alternative, less 
restrictive than the revised Visa MIF, existed at 
present. According to the Commission, the MIF 
did not eliminate competition between issuers 
or acquirers, nor did it eliminate competition 
between Visa and its competitors. The modiﬁ  ed 
Visa MIF therefore fulﬁ  lled the conditions for an 
exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty 
and Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement. 
ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER THE COMMISSION’S 
DECISION40
Visa’s exemption remained in force until 
31 December 2007. On 3 April 2009, the 
Commission adopted a Statement of Objection 
against Visa Europe. The Commission’s 
preliminary view was that the MIF set directly 
by Visa Europe restricted competition between 
acquiring banks, inﬂ  ated the cost of payment card 
acceptance for merchants and ultimately increased 
consumer prices. However, an MIF was not illegal 
as such, but had to contribute to technical and 
economic progress and beneﬁ  t consumers. 
In April 2010, Visa Europe committed itself 
to cap the yearly weighted average cross-
In the EU region, the MIF is set by the Visa EU board. 37 
Visa argued that all consumer payment instruments should be  38 
comprised, while EuroCommerce argued that Visa was active 
on the market for card networks, while three markets should be 
distinguished within the Visa system, namely card issuing, card 
acquiring and transaction processing.
Visa argued for an EU-wide or even world-wide market. 39 
Available at:  40 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_
details.cfm?proc_code=1_3939845
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border MIF applicable to transactions with its 
consumer immediate debit cards at 20 basis 
points (0.20%) for four years. The cap would 
also apply separately in each of those EEA 
countries for which Visa Europe directly set 
speciﬁ   c domestic consumer immediate debit 
MIF rates and in those EEA countries where the 
cross-border MIF rates applied in the absence of 
other MIFs. 
On 8 December 2010, the Commission made 
Visa Europe’s commitments legally binding 
for four years.41 In its decision, the Commission 
stated that the MIF applied by Visa Europe was 
in conformity with the merchant indifference 
methodology (tourist test). An MIF set above 
the level compliant with the tourist test would 
not appear to create efﬁ   ciencies that would 
outweigh the possibly anti-competitive effect 
of the MIFs, and a fair share of the resulting 
beneﬁ  ts would not be passed on to consumers 
(merchants and their subsequent purchasers). 
A reduction of the MIF to a level compliant 
with the tourist test would beneﬁ  t  merchants 
and their customers, both card users and non-
card users. The commitments made by Visa 
Europe were therefore considered suitable to 
remedy competition concerns expressed in the 
Commission’s Statement of Objection.
2.2 NATIONAL  DECISIONS
2.2.1 LATVIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS – LATVIAN 
COMPETITION COUNCIL
Latvian Competition Council decision, 
3 March 2011  42
The Latvian Competition Council (CC) decided 
in March 2011 that 22 Latvian commercial 
banks had breached the Competition Law by 
participating in a multilateral agreement on the 
interchange fees for card payments, thereby 
restricting competition in the Latvian cards 
market.
RELEVANT MARKET
The market for issuing of payment cards and for 
acquiring of card payment services (POS and 
internet) in Latvia.
CONCLUSIONS
The banks were not able to provide evidence 
that the beneﬁ   ts of the MIF counterbalanced 
the restrictions to competition, but focused on 
explaining the necessity of cards payments. 
The CC therefore found that an MIF was not 
considered necessary for promoting the cards 
market. 
The MIF had ﬁ   xed the minimum merchant 
service charge (MSC) set by acquiring banks, 
thus restricting acquiring banks’ capabilities 
to set lower MSCs than the MIF, i.e. to set the 
service price on the basis of free competition. 
Competition among acquiring banks was 
restricted, since they were aware that merchants 
would pay the same minimum MSC as other 
acquirers. The CC found that the MIF was not 
related to the issuing banks’ actual costs, but 
constituted an actual income for them. Since 
acquiring banks were also issuing cards, high 
MIFs were to the beneﬁ  t of both issuing and 
acquiring banks. The CC therefore found that 
the banks had motivation to obtain a ﬁ  nancial 
gain from the MIF.
The CC concluded that the multilateral agreement 
on MIFs was considered an agreement between 
competitors that – by object and effect – 
hampered, restricted and distorted competition 
in the relevant markets by excluding the most 
important tool for competition, i.e. competition 
based on price.
2.2.2 MASTERCARD AND BANKS – ITALIAN 
ANTITRUST AUTHORITY
Italian Antitrust Authority decision, 
4 November 2010 (I720)  43
The Commission’s decision of 8 December 2010 relating to  41 
proceedings under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA agreement 
(Case COMP/39.398 – Visa MIF).
Only a brief summary was available in English for drafting  42 
this paper (available at: http://www.kp.gov.lv/?object_
id=1084&module=news).
Only a brief summary was available in English for drafting  43 
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The Italian Antitrust Authority (AGCM) found 
that MasterCard company and eight banks had 
established agreements restricting competition 
designed to maintain high inter-bank fees 
for payments by credit or debit cards issued 
by MasterCard, by bundling this type of cost 
together with merchant membership fees, with 
direct consequences for consumer prices.
CONCLUSIONS 
The AGCM found that MasterCard, as an 
association of businesses, had ﬁ  xed an Italian-
speciﬁ   c MIF that was not derived from the 
system’s overall economic efﬁ  ciency. Incentives 
for MIF inﬂ   ation derived from the fact that 
higher MIFs (i) increase the direct proceeds for 
card issuer banks, (ii) increase the proceeds of 
acquirer banks, as the transaction volume of 
the expanding scheme increases, and (iii) the 
increased number of transactions lead to greater 
brand-name exposure for the MasterCard 
scheme itself, which translates into increases in 
scheme proceeds from license holders. 
By including membership fees and establishing 
speciﬁ   c clauses that hindered the making of 
comparisons with other schemes/payment 
instruments in their contracts with merchants, 
banks gave an undue advantage to the 
MasterCard brand, the scheme as a whole and 
the banks themselves. Individual banks used the 
membership mechanism to manifest a unitary 
agreement with MasterCard in order to promote 
the schemes expansion by passing the MIF on 
to merchants and, consequently, to the prices 
effectively applied to consumers.
2.2.3 PAYMENT CARD SCHEMES – HUNGARIAN 
COMPETITION AUTHORITY
Hungarian Competition Authority decision, 
24 September 2009 (Vj-18/2008) 44
The Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) 
found in September 2009 that the uniform 
interchange fees in transactions using payment 
cards of Visa Europe and MasterCard Europe, 
set by the Hungarian banks, breached the 
Competition Act. As a result of this practice, 
competition between payment card schemes and 
acquiring banks was distorted.
RELEVANT MARKET
The market of payment card schemes and card 
acquiring.
CONCLUSIONS 
Banks had uniformly determined the level of 
interchange fees for both major international 
card schemes, thereby impairing (i) competition 
between Visa and MasterCard and 
(ii) competition between acquiring banks. As a 
result of the agreement, the levels of merchant 
service charges were indirectly inﬂ  uenced, 
since the interchange fee served as an artiﬁ  cial 
minimum price. The GVH did not contest 
that collective multilateral agreements could 
produce substantial efﬁ  ciencies, but no evidence 
had been provided to show that the restriction of 
competition had been limited to the reasonably 
necessary level, and that a due share of the 
beneﬁ  ts had reached cardholders and retailers. 
On the contrary, (i) the level of the MIF had 
remained unchanged for years, despite changes 
on the market and decreased costs, (ii) a uniform 
MIF was applied for both credit and debit cards, 
despite credit cards being more expensive, and 
(iii) no cost analysis had been made, nor had the 
demands of the market been taken into account. 
The restriction of competition was considered by 
the GVH to originate mainly from the common 
treatment by banks of both card payment 
schemes. The GVH also found that the two 
payment card schemes (Visa and MasterCard) 
had taken part in the restriction of competition, 
since their operational rules had enabled banks 
to set interchange fees (which could be applied 
for both schemes) uniformly. This had served 
the interests of the card schemes, since it had 
excluded an element of competition between the 
schemes.
Only a summary of the decision was available in English for  44 
drafting this paper (available at: http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/
ﬁ  les/modules/module25/10769E8D7015B1618.pdf).47
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2.2.4 INTERCHANGE FEE IN VISA AND MASTERCARD 
SYSTEMS – POLISH OFFICE OF COMPETITION 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Polish Ofﬁ   ce of Competition and Consumer 
Protection decision, 29 December 2006 
(DAR 15/2006)  45
The Polish Ofﬁ  ce of Competition and Consumer 
Protection (OCCP) published its decision on 
interchange fees in Visa’s and MasterCard’s 
system on 4 January 2007, in where it found that 
20 Polish banks participating in the agreement 
on the multilateral setting of interchange fees 
had restricted competition by means of the joint 
setting of interchange fee rates.
RELEVANT MARKET 
The relevant product market was considered to 
be the market for acquiring services, involving 
the settling of consumer’s liabilities to merchants 
for products and services purchased by means of 
payment cards. The relevant geographical market 
was considered to be the territory of Poland.
CONCLUSIONS
The OCCP found that the interchange fee 
constituted the major part of the merchant service 
charge (sometimes more than 90%), and thus set 
a de facto ﬂ  oor for the merchant fee. Those fees 
led to an artiﬁ  cial growth of merchants’ costs, 
which translated into higher prices in shops, 
affecting all customers (including those paying 
with cash). 
The banks claimed that even if interchange 
agreements were restricting competition, 
interchange fees were necessary for the 
functioning of four-party card systems and that 
they fulﬁ  lled the requirements for exemption, 
due to their beneﬁ  cial impact on the economy. 
In that respect, the OCCP found that the 
interchange fee was not indispensable for the 
functioning of the scheme, since there were 
four-party card schemes that worked well 
without any interchange fees.46
The banks also claimed that the interchange fee 
was an instrument for the optimal distribution 
of costs, which led to a maximisation of 
the system’s size. According to the banks, 
interchange fees were an indispensable income 
source for issuing banks, allowing them to cover 
the costs related to card operations and to avoid 
charging cardholders. The OCCP found that 
the interchange fees set in both the Visa and 
the MasterCard systems before 2006 were not 
determined on the basis of any objective criteria, 
and that the cost analysis provided early in 2006 
was based on ﬂ  awed or incomplete assumptions. 
Those fees did not, therefore, fulﬁ  l  the  ﬁ  rst 
condition of the exemption, i.e. contributing 
to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress.
Regarding the issue of allowing consumers 
a fair share of the beneﬁ  ts resulting from the 
agreement, the banks claimed that there was a 
relationship between the amount of the fee and 
the costs incurred by the banks in relation to 
activities and services provided to the beneﬁ  t 
of merchants. The OCCP did not accept these 
arguments, stating that the growth of interchange 
fees was not related to a reduction of charges 
paid by card users and that the business of 
payment card issuing was highly proﬁ  table, 
which indicated that the interchange fee 
performed a role of an additional income source, 
not a subsidy allowing a reduction of charges 
paid by card users. With regard to the three 
cost categories discussed in the Commission’s 
Visa decision, the OCCP pointed out that they 
did not correspond to activities that would give 
merchants real beneﬁ  ts.47
Available at: http://www.uokik.gov.pl//news.php?news_id=1004. 45 
Dankort (Denmark), Bank Axept (Norway) and PIN  46 
(the Netherlands).
Financing deferred payments is not one of the payment system  47 
services provided to retailers. It is a service provided by card 
issuers directly to individual holder of cards that allow late 
payment.
Regarding the costs of the payment guarantee, the OCCP found 
that it was being paid twice, namely, ﬁ  rst, by cardholders to their 
bank in case of a lack of funds and, second, by merchants as part 
of the MIF. In addition, considering the beneﬁ  ts reaped from 
MIFs, banks might not pay sufﬁ  cient attention to the “quality” 
of their customers, which could contribute to increasing MIFs 
further.
With respect to payment processing costs, the OCCP found, 
considering the signiﬁ  cant variety of processing costs, that there 
had to exist a convincing direct relationship between a given 
activity and the beneﬁ  ts that merchants receive therefrom.48
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The President of the OCCP did not ﬁ  nd that 
the interchange fee would allow merchants 
a fair share of the beneﬁ  ts resulting from the 
interchange fee, since the cost base on which 
the fee built also included services provided by 
banks to card users. 
ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER THE DECISION
All the banks involved lodged an appeal 
with the Court of Competition and Consumer 
Protection (SOKiK). The banks claimed that 
the market on which the infringement was to 
occur had been erroneously deﬁ  ned. All of the 
appeals were examined and decided jointly 
by the Court. SOKiK upheld the charge of an 
erroneous deﬁ  nition of the relevant market and 
modiﬁ  ed the OCCP’s decision at the very ﬁ  rst 
hearing in the case (12 November 2008), ﬁ  nding 
no restrictive practices on the market as deﬁ  ned 
by the OCCP. 
The OCCP did not agree with this decision and 
lodged an appeal against the SOKiK’s judgement 
with the Court of Appeal.48 The appeal was 
based on both substantive and procedural 
grounds, claiming, inter alia, that the ﬁ  ndings of 
the SOKiK that the relevant market had been 
erroneously deﬁ  ned were incorrect and that its 
ruling conﬂ  icted with the jurisprudence of the 
European Commission, in particular with the 
latter’s decision in the MasterCard case. On 22 
April 2010, the Court of Appeal repealed the 
decision of the SOKiK and submitted it back to 
the SOKiK for review. The Court of Appeal 
shared the views expressed by the OCCP 
regarding the deﬁ  nition of the relevant market 
and the position of the EU Commission, as 
expressed in its decisions on cross-border 
interchange fees for Visa and MasterCard 
payments.
2.2.5 SERVIRED – SPANISH TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE DEFENCE OF COMPETITION
Case A 318/02, SERVIRED Interchange fees
In April 2005, the Spanish Tribunal for the 
Defence of Competition (TDC) rejected an 
application by ServiRed (a civil partnership of 
Spanish banks) seeking individual exemption 
for a system setting interchange fees for card 
payment transactions. 
The interchange fee structure proposed by 
ServiRed was based on a categorising of 
merchants by sector, depending on the average 
turnover in the market sector to which each 
merchant belonged, without any difference 
between debit and credit cards.
The TDC found it unacceptable that a uniform 
interchange fee should be charged on all card 
transactions, both credit and debit, without taking 
any cost or risk criteria into consideration. It 
stated, for example, that the ﬁ   nancing of the 
free funding period and the payment guarantee 
created greater costs in respect of credit card 
transactions than those incurred through debit 
card transactions. Notwithstanding a fundamental 
lack of transparency, the proposed interchange 
fee would also, according to TDC, contribute 
to establishing a higher ﬂ  oor for the merchant 
service charge to be paid by the merchants. 
The TDC found that the agreements between 
banks to set an interchange fee were equivalent 
to the concerted practice of ﬁ  xing prices, thereby 
constituting a breach of the Spanish Competition 
Act. The TDC referred to the Commission’s 
Visa decision,49 stating that the level of costs 
which Visa International was granted for cross-
border transactions represented a clear signal of 
the costs that might be authorised at a national 
level. ServiRed had failed to prove that the 
requirements for an exemption were fulﬁ  lled 
and the TDC therefore rejected ServiRed’s 
application for an individual exemption. 
Nevertheless, TDC acknowledged that the ﬁ  xing 
of interchange fees between card issuers could 
contribute to technical and economic progress 
provided that it met the conditions set out in the 
Spanish Competition Act. In order for it to grant 
Ruling available at: http://www.uokik.gov.pl//news.php?news_ 48 
id=2045
Commission decision of 24 July 2002 (Case No COMP/29.373). 49 49
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an exemption, the TDC deemed it essential that 
the following conditions be met:
A differentiation between credit (deferred    –
debit) cards and debit cards, in accordance 
with the different costs involved.
Debit card interchange fees may only include    –
deﬁ  ned authorisation and processing costs, 
and should be expressed as a ﬁ  xed amount 
per transaction.
Credit and deferred debit card interchange    –
fees may only include deﬁ  ned authorisation 
and processing costs, and should be 
expressed as a ﬁ  xed amount per transaction. 
The risk of fraud should be based on a real 
ﬁ  gure, such as a percentage of the transaction 
volume. 
Different interchange fees could be    –
applicable in the case of different ways of 
making purchases (e.g. by post, telephone 
and internet).
Interchange fees must be made public.   –
2.2.6 SISTEMA 4B – SPANISH TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE DEFENCE OF COMPETITION
Case A 314/2002 SISTEMA 4B
In December 2001, Sistema 4B applied for 
an individual exemption for a system to set 
interchange fees for transactions between banks 
arising from payments made with cards issued by 
its members. The TDC rejected the application 
in April 2005, with the same reasoning as that 
given for ServiRed above.
2.2.7 EURO 6000 – SPANISH TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE DEFENCE OF COMPETITION
Case A 287/00 Euro 6000
In July 2001, the Spanish company Euro 6000 
had been granted an exemption for its 
interchange fee setting. The interchange fees 
were set by grouping merchants in different 
sectors according to their activity. The fee for 
each of these sectors was set on the basis of 
objective information, such as the sectoral 
turnover per business and year in terms of 
interchange. In a new decision (11 April 2005), 
the TDC stated that since the granting of the 
exemption in 2001, the Commission’s Visa 
decision (2002) had provided greater certainty 
regarding the methodological criteria to be 
observed when determining authorisations of 
the interchange fee, making it essential that the 
fee reﬂ  ected the costs and the real risks inherent 
in the service provided. 
The TDC declared that all three systems for 
card payments on the Spanish market should be 
treated in the same way, so that the decision on 
ServiRed was extended to include the systems 
of Sistema 4B and Euro 6000. All three systems 
had to abandon their present arrangements by 
15 July 2005.
2.2.8 MASTERCARD – UK OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING 
(SET ASIDE BY THE COMPETITION APPEAL 
TRIBUNAL IN JUNE 2006)
Decision No. CA98/05/05 of 6 September 2005 
(Case CP/0090/00/S) 50 
The UK Ofﬁ  ce of Fair Trading (OFT) found in 
September 2005 that the collective agreement 
between members of MasterCard UK Members 
Forum Limited setting a fallback MIF for 
consumer credit and charge cards between 
1 March 2000 and 18 November 2004 was 
restricting competition. The decision was set 
aside by the Competition Appeal Tribunal in 
June 2006.
RELEVANT MARKET
The OFT found the relevant market to be split 
into three: the wholesale market for the provision 
of card transaction services between issuers and 
acquirers, the acquiring market and the issuing 
market. The relevant geographical market was 
identiﬁ  ed as the United Kingdom.
Available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ca98_public_ 50 
register/decisions/mastercard.pdf50
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Despite the divergent outcome, the OFT stated 
that there were considerable similarities between 
the reasoning and conclusions drawn in the 
OFT’s decision and the EU Commission’s Visa 
decision, despite the Commission’s decision 
dealing only with cross-border card payments 
and the OFT’s decision being restricted to intra-
UK arrangements. 
The OFT stated in its decision that the MIF 
agreement created an appreciable restriction of 
competition in two ways: ﬁ  rst, it gave rise to 
a collective agreement on the level of the MIF 
(essentially, a collective agreement on the price) 
applying to almost all domestic transactions, 
which signiﬁ   cantly restricted the scope for 
acquirers to compete on price by acting as a 
price ﬂ  oor. Second, the MIF agreement resulted 
in parties recovering costs of services provided 
that were not essential to the operation of 
the MasterCard scheme as a viable payment 
transmission mechanism (extraneous costs), 
e.g. the cost for providing an interest-free period. 
The recovery of extraneous costs through the 
MIF generated extra interchange revenue for 
issuers and distorted competition between the 
MasterCard scheme and other payment systems, 
and also between issuers within the MasterCard 
scheme.51
Payment card networks have the beneﬁ  t  of 
providing universal acceptance, as well as 
increasing the ease and reducing the costs of 
entry into the scheme. In principle, the OFT 
accepted that a collective agreement on the 
level of an MIF could beneﬁ  t consumers and 
satisfy all exemption conditions if set at an 
appropriate level, not higher that the costs of 
the payment transmission services incurred by 
issuers. However, the MIF went beyond this 
as it included costs that were not necessary for 
the transmission of the payment transaction and 
was therefore not indispensable for attaining 
the beneﬁ  ts which may arise from a collective 
agreement. In addition, consumers 52 were 
not considered to be receiving a fair share of 
any beneﬁ  ts arising from the MIF agreement, 
since the costs for the unnecessary highly 
set MIF were passed on to all the merchants’ 
customers, including those who used other 
payment methods. Since the MIF was used as 
an instrument for the recovery of extraneous 
costs, the OFT concluded that it was not set 
at an appropriate level, and did not, therefore, 
satisfy all exemption conditions. No penalty 
was imposed, as the MIF agreement to which 
the decision related was no longer in force.
THE COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL 
The OFT’s decision was submitted for appeal to 
the Competition Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal), 
which set the decision aside on 19 June 2006.53
The main reason for setting the decision 
aside was that the OFT’s defence in court 
diverged from the reasoning in its decision of 
September 2005.54 In addition, the period of 
infringement in the OFT’s Decision was limited 
to 18 November 2004, when responsibility 
for setting the default interchange fee was 
transferred from the members of MasterCard 
UK to MasterCard International. Due to the 
above reasoning, the OFT wanted to withdraw 
its decision with a view to investigating further 
MasterCard’s and Visa’s current arrangements, 
claiming that the changes to MasterCard’s 
arrangements meant that the Tribunal’s 
judgement might not, after all, give deﬁ  nitive 
First, if the MIF had not covered the costs for the free funding  51 
period, issuers could have competed more in relation to the 
prices they charged cardholders. Second, the extra revenue 
from a higher MIF meant that cardholders spending more on 
MasterCard cards were more attractive to issuers than would 
otherwise have been the case.
The concept of consumers should be understood to include  52 
consumers in general, not only consumers using MasterCard 
cards.
Decision available at: http://www.catribunal.org.uk/archive  53 
(search for MasterCard).
The divergences related to: (i) abandoning the counterfactual that  54 
in the absence of the collective price restriction (multilaterally 
agreed interchange fees), issuers and acquirers would enter 
into bilateral agreements, with arbitration as fallback and 
(ii) introducing a new counterfactual, to the effect that the 
MasterCard scheme could operate without an interchange fee, 
with issuers and acquirers honouring transactions “at par”, as 
well as (iii) the withdrawal of the position that MasterCard’s 
arrangements met the ﬁ   rst condition for exemption under 
Article 81(3) and (iv) that payment transmission costs should be 
measured by reference to those of the Maestro debit card scheme.51
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guidance on the law applicable. To avoid any 
uncertainty, which might have been the case 
if the OFT had withdrawn its decision, the 
Tribunal decided to set the decision aside.
On 19 October 2005, the OFT issued a 
statement of objections against Visa, and on 
2 February 2006 the OFT opened an investigation 
of the new MasterCard arrangements, which had 
come into effect after 18 November 2004. On 
9 February 2007, the OFT expanded the scope 
of its investigation to also include immediate debit 
cards. The OFT is currently awaiting the judgement 
of the European General Court in the appeal 
proceedings brought by MasterCard against the 
decision of the European Commission regarding 
MasterCard’s interchange fee arrangements, 
before taking any further action.52
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3  LEGAL ASSESSMENTS (ARTICLE 101 OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN 








Latvian commercial banks 
May 2011 
Relevant market  Card acquiring  Main focus is on inter-system 




Agreement between undertakings 
or decisions by associations of 
undertakings 
Yes Yes  Yes 
MIF justiﬁ  cation by card schemes 
and/or ﬁ  nancial institutions 
The MIF is a tool to balance 
cardholder and merchant demand 
and does not have the function of 
a “price” 
The MIF balances the 
conﬂ  icting interests of 
merchants and cardholders 
by allocating the costs of the 
system between the two user 
groups 
A MIF is necessary in order to 
ensure cards payment system 
and to promote the use of card 
payments 
Contributes to promoting 
technical or economic progress 
No, MasterCard has failed 
to demonstrate a casual link 
between the MIF and its targeted 
efﬁ  ciencies 
Yes, a large-scale international 
payment system with positive 
network externalities 
No, banks have not been 
able to provide any evidence 
that the beneﬁ  ts of the MIF 
agreement counterbalance the 
restrictions 
in competition 
Allowing consumers a fair share 
of the beneﬁ  ts 
No, the MIF includes elements 
that are not related to services 
which sufﬁ  ciently beneﬁ  t 
merchants 
Yes, the modiﬁ  ed MIF provides 
a fair share of the beneﬁ  ts 
to each category of user of the 
Visa system 
Indispensability Not proven, several EEA card 
schemes are currently operating 
without a MIF 
No alternative, less restrictive 
than the revised Visa MIF 
exists at present, which would 
achieve the advantages and 




The MIF does not eliminate 
competition between issuers, 
nor does it eliminate 
competition among acquirers, 
since they can still compete on 
other components, apart from 
the MIF53
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eight Italian banks 
November 2010 
GVH 
Hungarian ﬁ  nancial 




20 Polish banks in 




ServiRed, Sistema 4B, 





(set aside in June 2006) 
Payment card schemes 
(Visa, MasterCard) and 
card acquiring (ﬁ  nancial 
institutions) 
Card acquiring  Payment cards  Card issuing 
Card acquiring 
Provision of card 
transactions 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
The MIF is an 
indispensable income 
source for issuing banks, 
allowing them to cover 
the costs of their card 
operations and to avoid 
charging cardholders 
An interchange fee is 
indispensable for the 
operation of the network 
The MIF is a balancing 
mechanism enabling 
distribution of costs between 
participating issuers and 
acquirers 
No, the MIF speciﬁ  c 
to Italian-banks was 
not derived from the 
system’s overall 
economic efﬁ  ciency 
No, collective multilateral 
agreements may produce 
substantial efﬁ  ciencies, 
but no evidence is at 
hand that the restriction 
of competition has been 
limited to the reasonably 
necessary level 
No, the MIF has not been 
determined on the basis 
of any objective criterion, 
since the cost analysis 
behind the MIF is based 
on ﬂ  awed or incomplete 
assumptions 
Yes, as long as it meets 
the conditions set out in 
the Competition Act, 
but ServiRed has failed 
to prove this 
Yes, the MIF has increased 
the ease and reduced the costs 
of entry. Transaction costs 
are reduced in comparison 
with a fee structure based on 
bilateral agreements 
No, to promote the 
scheme’s expansion, 
MIFs were passed 
on to merchants and, 
consequently, to the 
prices applied to 
consumers 
No, cardholders and 
merchants have not 
received a due share 
of the beneﬁ  ts 
No: cardholders – the 
MIF is an additional 
income source for banks, 
not a subsidy that allows 
a reduction of charges; 
merchants – the MIF 
cost base also includes 
services provided by 
banks to card users, which 
do not beneﬁ  t merchants 
No, the recovery of 
extraneous costs excludes 
consumers from a fair share 
of the beneﬁ  ts arising from 
the MIF 
Not analysed since the 
MIF does not meet 
the ﬁ  rst and second 
conditions for exemption
 
Yes, (i) issuers and acquirers 
can enter into bilateral 
agreements, (ii) issuers are 
free to compete regarding 
services to cardholders and 
(iii) there is some scope for 
intrascheme competition on 
the acquiring market54
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